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ABSTRACT 
     With increased industrial, urban, and agricultural development, the capacity for 
ecosystems to produce Ecosystem Services (ES) in southern Alberta is under pressure. 
Market-Based Instruments (MBIs) are proposed to entice landowners to participate in ES 
provision programs. Due to the voluntary nature of these programs, it is necessary to 
identify the level of incentive needed to attract participants. From a survey in the Oldman 
River Basin, this study classified rural landowners into three groups based on their value 
orientations; each requiring different levels of financial incentive to participate in MBI 
programs. Additional non-payment benefits to participating also reduced the incentive 
requirements. The willingness of landowners to participate in these programs to protect 
water quality was explained using Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) variables, past 
behaviour, percent of income gained from land use, and generations of a family owning 
the land, which were significant variables in a regression model.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
     With growing populations and increasing economic development, governments 
around the world are being forced to deal with the pressures these activities are putting on 
the environment, which reduce the benefits we enjoy from healthy ecosystems. The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) reported that aquatic ecosystems are 
degrading more rapidly than other ecosystems from these pressures (MEA 2005). Even in 
Canada, which is known for its natural wilderness and has the third largest supply of 
fresh water in the world (Gleick et al. 2009), the pressures of human activity within 
ecosystems has been felt.  
     During the Walkerton Tragedy of 2000, thousands of people became ill and several 
died because drinking water had become contaminated with E. coli from farm runoff 
(O'Connor 2002a). Following an inquiry into the incident, and a similar one in North 
Battleford water contamination case in 2001, multiple barrier approaches to water 
protection were stressed, beginning with source water protection (O'Connor 2002b, 
Johnston and Fraser 2006).With source water protection, instead of focussing solely on 
water treatment, improvements of land and water management within a catchment are 
conducted to ensure healthy ecosystems and quality water. New York City has been able 
to prevent spending billions of dollars to incorporate filtration methods into their drinking 
water by using a source water protection approach (Smith and Porter 2010). In addition to 
less stress on water treatment facilities, healthier ecosystems within the catchment can 
provide multiple other services that are beneficial to the residents, such as recreation, 
aesthetic value, and wildlife habitat.  
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     In Alberta, the Water for Life Strategy (WFL) set out to provide a province wide 
strategy to ensure fresh water resources will be available to meet the needs for drinking 
water, economic development, and to provide healthy ecosystems for future generations 
to enjoy. The Land Use Framework (LUF) created the requirement for regional plans to 
be developed and implemented for the management of land use and scarce water 
resources. The regions generally align with the water basins of Alberta’s major rivers, and 
at a smaller watershed level watershed advisory and planning councils and water 
stewardship groups are working on water planning under the WFL strategy. Under the 
LUF an integrated cumulative effects approach is being taken to protect the health of the 
environment and protect source water. With little political appetite for command and 
control methods of achieving environmental goals, both the WFL and LUF stress the 
concept of ‘ecosystem services’ and the need to incorporate them into private land 
managers’ decision making through the use of voluntary market-based instruments. It is 
the point of this research to determine if southern Albertan landowners are willing to 
participate in such programs.   
1.1 Ecosystem Services 
     Ecosystem Services (ES), by a broad definition, are all the benefits people obtain from 
ecosystems, whether they are marketable or not. ES are economic, social, and often 
intrinsic benefits resulting from the natural processes of a healthy environment and 
biodiversity, which are essential to sustain a healthy and prosperous way of life (GoA 
2008). ES are broken down into four categories: 1) provisioning services such as food 
and water; 2) regulating services such as regulation of floods, drought, land degradation, 
and disease; 3) supporting services such as soil formation and nutrient cycling; and 4) 
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cultural services such as recreation, spiritual, religious, and other nonmaterial benefits 
(MEA 2005).  
     Wetlands and other aquatic ecosystems deliver a wide range of services that contribute 
to human well-being, such as wildlife and vegetation, water supply, water purification, 
climate regulation, flood regulation, shoreline protection, recreational opportunities, and 
tourism (MEA 2005). The primary direct drivers of degradation and loss of inland and 
coastal wetlands identified in the MEA are: i) infrastructure development, ii) land 
conversion, iii) water withdrawal, iv) eutrophication and pollution, v) overharvesting and 
overexploitation, and vi) the introduction of invasive alien species. The primary indirect 
drivers are population growth and increasing economic development (MEA 2005). 
     In semi-arid southern Alberta, aquatic and riparian ecosystems are central to healthy 
environments because they provide a large portion of the ES people benefit from (Patten 
1998). From an ES assessment of southern Alberta, the six most important services were 
found to be i) biological control, ii) erosion control and sediment retention, iii) water 
supply, iv) water regulation, v) nutrient cycling, and vi) disturbance regulation (GoA 
2007). Many of these can be provided through ES related to water. The attributes of 
water are affected by natural or human processes as it flows through the rest of the 
watershed into the waterways (Brauman et al. 2007, Baron et al. 2002). Therefore, all 
ecosystems within a watershed perform hydrological services that affect downstream 
users. However, household, city, industrial, and agricultural activities performed within 
these watersheds also affect downstream users, but usually in a negative way.  
     These human activities are in some way beneficial to society, but in many instances 
the loss of the ES benefits society enjoys are not considered in the decisions made by 
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private individuals. The southern Alberta ES assessment found that the expansion of 
anthropocentric assets at the expense of natural cover types negatively affects the ability 
of ecosystems to produce a wide range of ES, which in the long term requires substantial 
external inputs such as fuel and fertilizer in agriculture to offset the loss (GoA 2007). 
Since most ES other than what can be harvested tend not to be marketable, and some may 
not directly benefit the landowner where the ES originate, they are not fully considered in 
private decision making and are often under-produced according to the needs of society. 
Therefore, the challenge for policy makers is to find ways to influence land users to 
internalize the benefits of these services, as well as the cost of damaging ecosystems, into 
the private decision making so an adequate amount of ES is supplied to ensure healthy 
ecosystems and quality water for use in the economy and by society and the environment. 
 
1.2 Market-Based Instruments 
     A Market-Based Instrument (MBI) is often based on voluntary participation (Wunder 
2007), and shapes behaviour through price signals rather than explicit instructions 
(Hockenstein et al. 1997). As an environmental policy tool, MBIs aim to internalize the 
public benefits into private decision making in order to achieve the desired environmental 
goals. Although most do not consist of a true market, MBIs attempt to provide a financial 
value to a non-market good. So if there is a greater public demand for ES than being 
supplied by private lands, MBIs can provide financial incentive to those landowners to 
increase their land’s ES provision. In general, there are three types of MBIs: (1) price-
based instruments such as taxes, fees or Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), which 
are themselves sometimes used as an umbrella term for MBIs (Jack et al. 2008); (2) 
rights-based instruments such as tradable permits, offset schemes and reverse auction 
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markets; and (3) market friction instruments which aim to improve the existing market, 
such as eco-labelling (Henderson and Norris 2008).  
    Governments have traditionally relied on a ‘Command and Control’ (CAC) style of 
environmental regulation to achieve environmental goals (Hahn and Stavins 1991). 
However, many have found CACs to be too rigid and costly to implement as they force 
all firms to achieve the same level of mitigation, even though it may be relatively more 
costly for some firms than others (Portney 2003, Hockenstein et al. 1997, Keohane et al. 
1998). The inefficiencies of CACs gave rise for economists to advocate the use of MBIs 
to meet environmental objectives  by utilizing the cost heterogeneities between firms to 
minimize overall cost of achieving the objectives (Newell and Stavins 2003).  
     MBIs, however, have had mixed success. Many have not operated as well as predicted 
since programs were based on ideal conditions or failed to: consider political factors; 
incorporate transaction costs; remove uncertainty of property rights; provide a 
competitive market; provide appropriate incentives to participate; or take into account the 
“inability of firms to fully take advantage of the program opportunities because of flaws 
in their internal decision-making processes” (Hockenstien et al. 1997, p. 18). However, if 
implemented properly, MBIs can be useful in increasing the provision of ES. In Alberta’s 
WFL and LUF, MBIs have been promoted as tools to explore that may help internalize 
the public’s need for ES into private landowner’s decision making.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
     The problem of adopting new MBI programs for ES provision is that they are a 
relatively new policy tool and have been untested in southern Alberta. It is not clear how 
willing the landowners are to accept the use of the instruments or if they will participate 
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in these voluntary programs, although such information would be very beneficial for the 
creation of successful ES programs. The field of economics has multiple methods of 
calculating their willingness to participate but the models tend to focus on the willingness 
itself and less on why the landowners are willing. The fields of social psychology and 
sociology try to understand the ‘why’ by identifying the influence of a person’s attitudes 
and values on their actions, more of which will be discussed in the Chapter Two. 
Combining some economic and psychological methods together, this study aimed at 
answering the following research question: what factors affect the willingness of 
landowners to participate in MBI programs for ES provision?  
 
1.4 Research Objectives and Hypotheses  
     This is a relatively new area of study, especially in Alberta, so several research 
objectives were required to answer the question. On the basis of a review of related 
research, it was decided that the following objectives must be achieved in order to answer 
the research question:  
(1) Identify different groups of landowners based on the values that influence 
their decision making; 
(2) Discover if the willingness to participate in MBI programs for ES 
provision differs across the landowner groups;  
(3) Determine if other non-payment benefits influence the willingness to 
participate and if that influence differs between the landowner groups; and 
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(4) Discover personal, land, and situational factors that most strongly 
influence landowners’ willingness to participate in MBI programs for 
water quality supportive ES provision.  
     To address the four research objectives, six hypotheses were tested within three 
spheres of research using data gathered from a phone-survey of rural landowners in 
southern Alberta. The first sphere addressed the first research objective by using cluster 
analysis and chi-square tests to test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Landowners do not have uniform values that influence their decisions. 
Instead, landowners can be clustered into distinct value orientation groups based 
on the importance they place on three value types: economic, environmental, and 
lifestyle. 
H2: Members of each value orientation group have different land and personal 
characteristics. 
     The second sphere of research addressed the second and third objectives by examining 
the financial compensation landowners require in order to participate in MBI programs 
for ES provision. The following three hypotheses were tested: 
H3: Members of each value orientation group require a different financial 
compensation to participate in MBI programs for the provision of ES. 
H4: Scenarios that contain different combinations of environmental, lifestyle, and 
economic benefits from participating in MBI programs for ES provision cause 
landowners to require different financial compensations. 
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H5: The changes in financial compensation required by landowners to participate 
in MBI programs for ES provision caused by the different benefit scenarios vary 
between the value orientation groups. 
     The third sphere addressed the fourth objective by using regression analysis to 
determine which variables explain the variation in southern Albertan landowners’ 
agreement to the use of MBIs for ES provision to protect water quality. The Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB), which is expanded on in Chapter 2, claims to encompass the 
factors that influence willingness to perform a behaviour through measuring certain 
beliefs a person may hold in relation to the behaviour so this model was used to 
accomplish this objective. Other variables often included in expanded TPB models, as 
well as numerous socio-demographic characteristics of the landowners and their land, 
were also incorporated as control variables to test the final hypothesis:  
H6: The TPB variables are significant in explaining the variance of the 
landowners’ agreement that MBIs should be used for water quality supportive 
ES provision.  
 
1.5 Thesis Organisation 
     The thesis is organised in six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a literature overview to 
provide an understanding of the water and environmental issues in southern Alberta and 
the use of MBIs for ES provision. The chapter also provides reasoning for using belief 
systems and the theory of planned behaviour to understand rural landowners’ willingness 
to participate in these MBI programs. Chapter 3 presents the location of the study area 
and provides further information of the environmental issues and other land use factors. 
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The chapter then explains the methods used to collect the data and achieve the research 
objectives. Chapter 4 lays out the results from the three spheres of research, providing 
tables and explanations of the information when necessary. Chapter 5 discusses the 
results in the previous chapter and how they relate to the hypotheses and previous 
literature. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a synthesis of the major results, the policy 
implications for the use of MBIs to provide ES for water quality protection in southern 
Alberta, limitations of the research, and recommendations for future research. The 
remaining sections include the list of references and the appendices, which include the 
interview schedule and questionnaires used to collect the data to make this thesis 
possible.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
2 ALBERTA’S CALL FOR THE USE OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS 
FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVISE PROVISION AND LANDOWNERS 
WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE  
     The overall goal of this chapter is to provide background on the potential use of MBIs 
in environmental policy to increase the provision of ES in Alberta in order to protect 
water quality and also to review environmental behaviour literature to understand 
southern Albertan landowners’ willingness to participate in such voluntary MBI 
programs. The first section describes water use and its effect on the ecosystems in 
southern Alberta, the concepts and growth of ES and MBIs as environmental policy tools 
and how they fit into current Alberta water and land use policy to provide healthy 
ecosystems and source water protection. The chapter then explains the components of the 
value-attitude-behaviour hierarchy to provide a theoretical understanding of why people 
behave in certain ways, as well as introduce the concept of value orientations. This is 
beneficial because with voluntary programs, the government cannot force landowners to 
participate, but knowing what drives their behaviour can help identify the proper 
incentive they would require. The TPB is outlined to show how landowners’ decisions to 
participate in MBI programs for ES can be explained through specific attitudes and 
beliefs about the situation. A conceptual framework is built at the end of the chapter, 
using the TPB, value orientations, and situational factors to achieve the research 
objectives. 
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2.1 Alberta, Water, and Healthy Ecosystems 
     Since Alberta’s beginning people have had to deal with water shortages and continue 
to do so today. Roughly 80% of the water is in the northern half of the province while 
80% of the population and most of the economic activity are in the semi-arid south (GoA 
2002). Water is therefore a limiting factor in southern Alberta for both human activity 
and for healthy ecosystems. Irrigation development starting in the early 20
th
 century 
reduced this limitation for agricultural activities, making Alberta a centre for livestock 
production in Canada and it has given farmers the ability to grow crops that require larger 
water inputs than rain can provide. However, irrigation is the largest user of water in 
Alberta, accounting for 60 to 65 percent of the total water consumed on average (GoA 
2014a), and it accounts for 88% of total allocation in the Oldman River Basin (ORB) 
(Rock and Mayer 2006).  
     Water is over-allocated in the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB), so during a 
drought, like in 2001/2002, junior water license holders may not be able to use their 
allotted amount, and water for ecosystem function have even less priority (GoA 2008a). 
The 1969 Master Agreement on Apportionment between the provinces of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba provides some restriction on the amount of water that can 
be consumed, because it requires at least 50% of the natural flow of the SSRB, as well as 
from other interprovincial watercourses, must enter Saskatchewan at the border (PPWB 
2014). However, there is no policy in Alberta regarding the amount of water a sub-basin 
within an interprovincial watercourse must supply to the Saskatchewan appropriation, as 
long as an adjoining sub-basin makes up the difference (GoA 2006). This allows for more 
use in one sub-basin than another, so ecosystem functions can become stressed in areas. 
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With heavy irrigation demands in the ORB, assessments of aquatic and riparian 
conditions have shown numerous areas within the sub-basin to be assessed as ‘healthy 
with problems’ but others as ‘degraded’ (Poirier and De Loe 2011). On the other hand, 
the Red Deer River sub-basin, with less irrigation, is hydrologically the healthiest in the 
SSRB (GoA 2006). 
     Allocating water for environmental purposes would result in immediate benefits for 
these stressed aquatic ecosystems (Poirier and De Loe 2011), however cultural and 
political factors make it a difficult initiative to implement. Irrigators have fought with 
drought and the semi-arid nature of southern Alberta to provide their livelihoods over the 
last 100 years so they have a historical connection to their water use and are not willing 
to give it up (Poirier and De Loe 2011). With no support, politicians are unable and 
unwilling to change the ‘first-in-time, first-in-right’ (FIT-FIR) water allocation system 
that gives priority to senior water license holders over junior or environmental 
allocations. The 1999 Water Act added a water market to FIT-FIR so license holders can 
sell their allocations temporarily or permanently to encourage efficient water use and the 
government can hold back 10 percent of the traded water for conservation purposes, but 
because it has seen little use (Bjornlund 2010), efforts to protect aquatic and riparian 
ecosystems need to be made in other ways. To attain healthy ecosystems and work 
around FIT-FIR, the GoA must focus more on water quality issues instead of water 
quantity.  With the WFL and LUF, the GoA is calling for the use of MBIs to give private 
landowners incentive to increase ES provision on their land, increasing the quality of 
source water and ecosystems around it.  
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2.2 MBIs and ES in Environmental Policy  
     MBIs and ES are two complementary concepts that have increasingly been 
incorporated into environmental policy over the last four decades. The concept of ES 
began in the late 70s as an educational tool to increase the interest in biodiversity 
conservation by illustrating the utilitarian benefits of ecosystem functions to society, and 
by the 90s the concept was becoming more mainstream (Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010). 
At this time, Costanza et al. (1997) broadened the interest in the topic by actually 
estimating the economic value of ES. After the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 
2003, ES found a secure spot in the environmental policy agenda around the world, and 
presently they are influencing economic decisions through the increased use of MBIs 
(Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010).    
     Economists have also been promoting MBIs as environmental policy tools since the 
70s (Hahn and Stavins 1991), but with most of the environmental focus being on 
emissions at the time, environmental groups opposed their use. Tradable permits were 
equated to “licences” or “rights” to pollute and given the flexible nature of MBIs these 
groups perceived that they would lead to less pollution control (Hockenstein et al. 1997, 
Hahn 2000). However, the 90s showed an increase in MBI use by policy makers, 
especially in the US, due to the success of the 1990 amendment to the US Clean Air Act 
for the SO2 Allowance Trading System (Henderson and Norris 2008). This system of 
tradable permits proved on a large scale that MBIs were able to achieve cost 
minimization for the industries involved while also generating environmental 
improvements that went further than what the CAC approaches could have produced 
(Stavins 1998). Innovative methods to keep abatement costs low were developed to 
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capitalizing on the heterogeneities in different firms’ abilities to reduce emissions, 
thereby creating competition that reduced emissions further than mandated level, 
allowing them to be banked for future use (Colby 2000). These benefits from flexibility 
are also advocated in other kinds of MBIs (Hahn and Stavins 1992, Jaffe 2001), which 
allow MBIs to be used in policy for other environmental issues such as encouraging 
landowners to manage their land and water for ES provision.  
     The ability of MBIs to provide similar results to command and control regulation, 
while allowing more flexibility and potential cost savings has made it become prominent 
in recent environmental policy in Alberta. Additionally, voluntary MBIs are politically 
more achievable in southern Alberta than command and control regulation for ecosystem 
protection; as is the case in North America (Johnston and Fraser 2006). This has been 
illustrated through the introduction of water sharing markets to encourage more efficient 
use of water, rather than changing the FIT-FIR allocation system. Irrigation 
representatives in Alberta have walked out of past meetings when the topic of removing 
FIT-FIR have been brought up (Poirier and De Loe 2011), so voluntary programs are 
easier for policy makers to put through. There are a few examples of MBIs that are 
already in use in Alberta, such as the water market, and others like conservation 
easements, carbon offsets, small NOx/SOx emissions trading programs for the electricity 
sector, deposit-refund schemes, and a carbon charge on large final emitters (GoA 2010). 
It has also been noted that more coercive voluntary methods, like MBIs, have higher rates 
of adoption than other more passive or educational voluntary programs (Johnston 2006). 
The GoA has outlined in its major land and water strategies development of MBIs to 
entice ES provisions and protect ecosystems and source water.   
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2.2.1 Current Alberta Legislation and Policy 
     After a multi-year drought at the turn of the millennium, the GoA started a public 
consultation process about the future of the provinces limited water resources, creating 
the Water For Life Strategy (WFL) in 2003 (GoA 2008a), which fulfilled the requirement 
in the Water Act to develop a provincial water strategy. The WFL’s three goals are (1) to 
provide safe, secure drinking water supplies for all Albertans, (2) to ensure healthy 
aquatic ecosystems, and (3) to provide reliable, quality water supplies for a sustainable 
economy (GoA 2003a). All three of these goals add to Albertans’ quality of life but 
healthy aquatic ecosystems are preconditions for securing the quality water needed for 
the other goals. In the 2008 renewal of the WFL strategy, the use of MBIs are briefly 
mentioned for maintaining flexible and adaptive water management (GoA 2008a) but the 
2009 WFL Action Plan lists the development of MBIs for ES as one of the three key 
actions for water conservation in the province (GoA 2009).  
     The year 2008 also saw plans to develop MBIs for ES within the Land Use 
Framework (LUF), which established seven regions and called for the development of 
land-use plans for each region, including the South Saskatchewan Regional Plan, to 
integrate land, water and environmental resource planning within the regions. The LUF 
sets out to achieve Alberta’s long-term economic, environmental and social goals through 
finding new approaches to managing the province's land and natural resources, including 
water. For land stewardship and conservation on private lands, the LUF emphasises the 
use of more flexible MBIs where appropriate, while on public lands more traditional 
regulatory mechanisms will be employed (GoA 2008). The legal basis of this regional 
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land-use planning was established through the Alberta Land Stewardship Act (ALSA) in 
2009 (GoA 2014b).  
     Both the LUF and WFL overlap with the GoA’s desire to use MBIs to promote the 
provision of ES to protect ecosystem health and water quality. The ES will provide 
economic, social, and environmental benefits to Alberta, but to supply them the MBI 
must provide a suitable financial incent to the landowners. To get a better grasp on what 
is suitable, policy makers should know the landowners’ willingness to participate and 
what influences their willingness. The remaining sections of this chapter explain how 
core beliefs influence actions and the willingness to perform them.  
 
2.3 The Value–Attitude–Behaviour Hierarchy and their Interaction 
      The value-attitude-behaviour hierarchy is a way to describe a system of beliefs that 
influences behaviour. Beliefs are basic ideas about what a person can think to be true or 
false (descriptive beliefs), good or bad (evaluative beliefs), or what should or should not 
happen (prescriptive beliefs) (Rokeach 1968). Beliefs are the guides to action. Through 
an organization of many beliefs, or a ‘belief system’, a person forms implicit expectations 
of how the world works (Scheibe, 1970). The value–attitude–behaviour hierarchy 
illustrates the system of beliefs where the influence of beliefs flows from general values 
to more specific attitudes, and finally to the behaviour that is a result of these beliefs 
(Homer and Kahle 1988). Values are core beliefs that all other beliefs are based on, and 
attitudes are formed by many beliefs around a specific object or situation (Rokeach 
1968). This leads to a relationship where behaviour is indirectly influenced by values 
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through a direct relationship with attitudes (Bamberg 2003, de Groot and Steg 2007a). 
Both values and attitudes are expanded upon in the following sections.  
     Although beliefs are the expectations of how the world works, experiences with the 
real world are often imperfect and incomplete, and therefore the beliefs are predictive and 
identified in probabilistic terms (Scheibe 1970). These probabilistic beliefs are also 
paired with the confidence a person has in them (i.e., the range or accuracy of the 
probability) (Scheibe 1970). In the section on the TPB, this concept is expanded on 
further through Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) expectancy-value model, where the 
expectancy relates to probabilistic beliefs and the ‘value’, in this case, is the paired 
confidence of those beliefs. 
 
2.3.1  Values       
In everyday language, the word ‘value’ is used in a number of ways: what something is 
worth, opinions of that worth, and moral principles (Dietz et al 2005). The first value 
refers to the usefulness or importance of a thing and is thus akin to ‘utility’ in economics. 
The second value looks at our assessment of worth or why we like the things we do. It 
expands from the simplicity of market figures to complex ‘intrinsic values’ that evade 
market pricing and have troubled economists trying to place dollar signs on them for 
decades. Where the first two values can be focused on specific things, the third value of 
moral principles is more general, suggesting standards for various states of the world and 
our actions. In economic and rational actor models, this type of value usually is not 
accounted for and behaviours are the result of thoughtful decisions about preferences that 
maximize foreseeable utility. However, as Dietz et al. (2005) explains, to resolve the 
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conflict between differing preferences, it is the values that tell us which are better by 
invoking moral considerations. Thus, “values are about what is desirable, whereas 
preferences are only about what is desired” (Dietz et al. 2005, p. 341). It is this third use 
of value that is associated with the value-attitude-behaviour hierarchy and this is the one 
focused on in this research. 
     Four characteristics set values apart from other beliefs: 1) values are the most central 
component of a person’s belief system and they are very stable over the person’s lifetime 
(Rokeach 1968, Bem 1970). The resistance to change a person’s values has been 
supported by linking the values to where and how the person was socialized (Lowe and 
Pinhey 1982), illustrating that they change little from their formation; 2) although being 
single and stable beliefs, values are linked to many other beliefs and are used as standards 
that attitudes are based on and on which behaviour is evaluated (Homer and Kahle 1988). 
Values represent a person’s beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and end goals (Rokeach 
1968); 3) values transcend objects and situations, and consequently are not limited to one 
issue (Rokeach 1968, Schwartz 1992). This ties in with the second point since values are 
not limited to specific situations, they can be the base of many other beliefs. Finally, 4) 
the number of values is limited to only a few dozen because of a value’s encompassing 
nature. This is in contrast to the thousands of beliefs and attitudes a person can have 
(Schwartz 1992, Rokeach 1968, Dietz et al. 2005).   
     Values are ordered in a system of priorities but many values often transcend the same 
situations (Rokeach 1968, Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, Schwartz 1992). As a result values 
can often work together or in competition with one another. Because of this, an 
individual’s values are organized into a hierarchy of importance that can change at 
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different times and under different circumstances (Homer and Kahle 1988). Those on top 
at any given time or circumstance will be most influential to a given situation (Rokeach 
1968, Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, Schwartz 1992). While many individuals can hold the 
same set of values, the relative importance of the values differs from person to person, 
but different hierarchies of values that are similar enough can be generalized as the same 
‘value orientation’. Studying VOs can provide a link between the interaction of important 
values in a situation and the attitudes developed around that situation (Vaske and 
Donnelly 1999). 
 
2.3.2  Value Orientation 
     In the literature on environmental behaviour, VOs have been useful tools to 
summarize the hierarchy of people’s values that influence their decisions and behaviour. 
The structure of VOs allows one to relate the systems of value priorities, as an integrated 
whole, to other variables (Schwartz 1994). Scheibe (1970) outlined a spectrum of value 
types one may hold, although many values are not applicable to every situation and some 
may work together while others are opposed. In a survey to identify a universal value 
system, Schwartz (1992; 1994) proposed 56 values that respondents would rate the 
importance of in their life. Ten motivational types of values emerged, which were then 
plotted on a two-dimensional space that would comprise four separate clusters. The first 
dimension reflects the openness to change versus conservatism, and the second 
dimension reflects the social or self-transcendent values versus personal interests or self-
enhancement. The second dimension has been shown in research to be especially related 
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to environmental behaviour (de Groot and Steg 2008) and it is identified as two VOs: 
egoism and altruism.  
     Other researchers have organised people’s VOs into a biocentric/anthropocentric 
continuum when related to environmental issues, such as wilderness preservation (Vaske 
and Donnelly 1999). Vaske and Donnelly are able to empirically show that their VOs 
were able to predict people’s attitudes towards wilderness preservation, and that the 
attitudes mediated the relationship between VOs and behavioural intentions through a 
structural equation path analysis. Although older research was not able to confirm it 
(Stern and Dietz 1994), in more recent literature a further distinction of major VOs has 
been made by dividing the altruistic VO into two unique groups to make a total of three 
VOs that are important to environmental behaviour: humanistic altruism; biospheric 
altruism; and egoism (de Groot and Steg 2007, de Groot and Steg 2008, Dietz et al. 
2005).  The split in the altruistic values comes from the acknowledgement of intrinsic 
value of the environment. The human altruistic value orientation is similar to the self-
interest orientation because they are both anthropocentric and only give the environment 
an instrumental value, where biospheric altruism shows concern for species and 
environments above that of human use (Dietz et al. 2005).   
     Narrowing the broad topic of general environmental behaviour and ethics to that of the 
behaviour and decisions of farmers and landowners in relation to their landholdings, 
similar, yet more specific VOs have been identified. From their review of the sociological 
and psychological literature on the values farmers may have for their landholdings, 
Maybery et al. (2005) identified three common VOs: economic, conservation, and 
lifestyle. They were able to successfully identify separate groups of Australian farmers 
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based on these VOs. The behaviour of farmers with an economic VO is motivated 
strongly by business and profits and thus would be more akin to the egoistic VO in the 
broader environmental behaviour literature. Farmers with the lifestyle VO were 
motivated by family and community, and thus they had more ties with the humanistic 
altruism VO. Finally, the farmers with the conservation VO, who were concerned with 
environmental stewardship, were analogous with the biospheric VO.  
     A similar approach was taken by Kuehne et al (2008) to differentiate rural irrigators in 
Australia based on their values towards the water allocation reform that aimed to provide 
more water for the environment. The study focused more on the values around family, 
profit, and buying or selling land and water than environmental values. The VO groups 
identified in their study were: investors (25%), who were profit-oriented; providers 
(50%), who tended to be opposite from investors but generally family succession 
oriented, and; lifestylers (25%), who were somewhere in between the other two groups 
on most values. Although a VO related to the biospheric or conservation orientations did 
not surface in the study, it is easy to see that the investors VO group is related to egoism 
and the providers VO group more to altruism.  
     In this study, the typology of VOs similar to those identified by Maybery and his 
colleagues was adopted. Both Maybery et al (2005) and Kuehne et al. (2008) claimed that 
grouping landowners into different VOs will help to understand their motivations and 
may allow policy makers to make informed policies. Treating landowners as a whole may 
make it difficult to identify important values that motivate one particular landowner 
group. Schultz and Zelezny (2003) argued similarly that it is necessary to frame 
environmental messages according to the salient values of a culture. For example, people 
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with strong egoistic and economic values could be targeted with messages about 
increased property value or farm productivity associated with the adoption of some 
environmentally beneficial land practices. The more altruistic groups (lifestyle and 
environmental) could be targeted with messages about helping other people or protecting 
the environment. 
     Values and VOs, however, are broad strokes when it comes to examining particular 
behavioural choices. Values are stable and cannot explain details about specific 
behaviour. VOs have a greater connection to behaviour as they illustrate the interaction of 
different values for specific situations. However, according to the value–attitude–
behaviour hierarchy, the cogitative beliefs that directly influence behaviour are the 
attitudes people form about specific situations. The following section therefore defines 
attitudes and how they are formed. 
 
2.3.3  Attitudes 
     An attitude, as Rokeach (1968, p. 112) defines it, is “a relatively enduring 
organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some 
preferential manner.” The objects and situations may be physical or social, concrete or 
abstract (Rokeach 1968). The attitudes are all evaluations of something quite specific, 
ranging from positive to negative. As a result, a person may have a multitude of attitudes 
depending upon objects or situations (Dietz et al. 2005). In other words, a person forms 
an attitude around every object or situation they come across in life. In terms of ES 
provision, different landowners are likely to have different attitudes towards providing 
ES on their land.  Adding MBIs in order to influence the landowners into providing ES 
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on their land is another factor that will shape their attitude towards the act. There is a 
balancing act inside the mind of each landowner between his or her relevant beliefs to 
form an attitude that is either for, against, or indifferent to the object or situation, and thus 
shaping their behaviour.  
     Although attitudes predispose behaviours, values are essential in forming peoples’ 
attitudes. Values provide the base from which the beliefs that form attitudes stem; 
therefore the attitudes correspond with the most important values in VOs. For example, a 
positive attitude towards protecting ES would likely be shaped by an underlying value of 
environmental protection and a biospheric VO. In addition, while values are quite 
consistent over time, attitudes are less consistent (Rokeach 1968). The introduction of 
different external factors influences the importance of values in VOs and therefore the 
attitudes are likely to change. Further discussion on attitudes and how they are formed is 
found in section 2.3.1, relating to the TPB. In the next section, the influence of socio-
demographic and external factors on behaviour is expanded upon.  
 
2.4 Socio-Demographic and External Factors  
     Socio-demographic, property characteristics and other situational characteristics of the 
landowners may also help to explain their ES provision choices.  Studies of 
environmental concern and behaviour in the 1970s and 1980s used attitudes and values as 
the principle variables for explanation and prediction (Corraliza and Berenguer 2000); 
however, their predictive capabilities were found to be limited. Corraliza and Berenguer 
(2000) state that this was because the levels of measurement used in these studies were 
often too general, abstract and hypothetical in nature to relate to the research topics while 
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little importance was given to variables of a situational nature.  In the 1990s the focus of 
predictive variables shifted to situational factors expected to facilitate or inhibit 
responsible environmental behaviour. These situational factors  were external to the 
person’s beliefs and included variables measuring the social setting, such as norms, but 
also the characteristics of the physical setting and the people carrying out the 
environmental actions  (Corraliza and Berenguer 2000).  There are, however, many 
possible external factors and they differ from each situation, making them case specific.  
Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) reviewed situational factors of adoption of conservation 
agriculture by farmers in 31 different studies.  They performed a synthesis of these 
studies and found that there were no universal predictors of farmers’ behaviour among 
the variables identified by each study. Commonly used variables in studies of farm 
practices and the participation in government programs include wealth, age, sex, 
education, experience, land size, type of land uses, family involvement, succession 
planning, and political affiliation (Marshall 2004, Knowler and Bradshaw 2007, Konisky 
et al. 2008). 
     Corraliza and Berenguer (2000) argued that to improve the explanatory or predictive 
power of both internal (attitudes and values) and situational (socio-demographic and 
external) variables, they must be used in tandem and understood in relation to one 
another.  They found that the predictive power of these internal factors were greatest 
when the influence of the situational factors were consistent with that of the person’s 
attitudes, and they were smallest if in conflict, such as attitude supporting action but 
economic barriers preventing action. It is when both the internal and situational variables 
support an action, or a non-action, that it is likely to occur (Corraliza and Berenguer 
 25 
 
2000).  Therefore, understanding how situational variables and internal variables of 
values and attitudes influence behaviour is important to better predict whether a certain 
action or behaviour is likely to take place, such as the adoption of MBI for the provision 
of ES. Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour is a model that incorporates both 
internal attitudes and situational factors to improve explanatory power and is explained in 
the following section. 
  
2.5  Theory of Planned Behaviour  
     Many of the problems with earlier models attempting to predict behaviour came from 
the exclusion of belief variables or situational factors. Additionally, the use of overly 
general values and attitudes such as environmental concern are too broad for successfully 
predicting behaviour for specific issues of interest, such as participation in specific MBI 
programs for ES provision. Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) is a 
model (figure 2.1) that attempts to resolve these faults since its situation-specific 
cognitive variables have direct influence on behaviour, while environmental concern has 
been shown to have a substantial effect on those TPB variables (Bamberg 2003). To 
explain one’s intention to behave, a direct antecedent of actual behaviour, the TPB not 
only uses one’s attitudes towards the behaviour as predictor, but it also incorporates 
social pressures and control factors that the person perceives to be important for the 
specific action and their ability to perform it (Ajzen 1991). These external situational 
factors are represented in the model by the person’s internal beliefs about them and thus 
are called subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. Ajzen (2006) states that 
these three considerations, attitudes toward the behaviour, subjective norms, and 
 26 
 
perceived behavioural controls are what guide human action, and they are created by 
aggregating a number of beliefs specific to the action. TPB has been heavily used in the 
prediction of health behaviour (Armitage and Conner 2001) but has recently been used to 
explain environmental behaviour, including water conservation (Trumbo and O'Keefe 
2001, Lam 2006, Clark and Finley 2007) and landowners’ decisions in riparian zone 
management (Beedell and Rehman 2000, Corbett 2002, Fielding et al. 2005). This section 
will explain the theory behind the TPB and its variables as well as some methodology 
used to capture and represent them. 
 
Figure 2.1: Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) 
 
2.5.1 Attitude Towards the Behaviour 
     When a landowner considers performing an action, their beliefs surrounding that 
behaviour are taken into account and an attitude is formed that may support, oppose, or 
be neutral towards the completion of the action. Ajzen’s attitude toward behaviour is the 
variable in the TPB that attempts to capture this aspect of decision making (Figure 2.1). 
There are, however, many beliefs surrounding different behaviours and some of those 
beliefs may not be considered by all. Behavioural Beliefs (Figure 2.1) are the important 
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beliefs that make up the attitude. The Expectancy – Value Equation (Fishbein and Ajzen 
1975) is employed to calculate the attitude towards the behaviour from these behavioural 
beliefs (equation 2.1). In the Expectancy – Value Equation (with ‘value’ used in a sense 
of numerical representation of strength), Schiebe’s (1970) probabilistic beliefs and the 
confidences of those beliefs  can be seen as the behavioural belief strength (b) and the 
outcome evaluation (e), respectively. These behavioural beliefs (be) are paired around a 
belief item (i), and the products of each pair are summed to approximate the attitude 
towards the behaviour (AB). 
               (2.1) 
     The behavioural belief strength, b, identifies how strongly the person believes in or 
agrees with that belief item. In other words, b is the expectancy or how likely the person 
will think that belief to be true. In Rokeach’s (1968) terms it is a descriptive belief. The 
outcome evaluation, e, identifies the importance of the belief item and its consequences, 
giving it a value on a scale such as “good” or “bad”.  For Rokeach (1968), this is an 
evaluative belief. A relevant belief item (i) is the statement that ‘watering cattle away 
from a creek will protect water quality’. A person can first express how strongly they 
believe the statement to be true (b) and then identify the degree to which they think the 
outcome is good/bad or important/unimportant (e). As said before, however, attitudes are 
formed by many beliefs surrounding a behaviour so the Value – Expectancy Equation 
and TPB includes multiple pairs of behavioural beliefs. Another belief example 
surrounding the behavioural action of watering cattle away from a creek is the increased 
expenses needed to purchase watering equipment. Is this likely to happen or be an 
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important issue? The number of potential behavioural belief pairs, however, can be nearly 
limitless. So to enter them into a model, a system must be put in place.  
     Ajzen (1991) explains that using the most salient beliefs in regard to the behaviour are 
enough for approximation of the actual attitude. For different individuals, however, 
certain beliefs may be more important than others, making it difficult to compare the 
effect of their attitude upon their behaviour. To compensate for this Ajzen (2006) 
suggests identifying the modal beliefs the study population holds through preliminary 
investigation. As a result, the attitudes are simplified for easier computation and 
comparison by using fewer beliefs that are more relevant to the study population as a 
whole. With the salient beliefs identified, statements can be formed to elicit responses in 
a questionnaire format. The questionnaire statements are answered on a rating scale, 
usually from 1 to 7, with opposing terms on opposite ends such as “strongly disagree” 
and “strongly agree” for the behavioural belief strengths (b) and “very  bad” and “very 
good” for outcome evaluation (e). The resulting response numbers are then entered into 
the equation to form the behavioural beliefs (be) and attitude towards the behaviour (AB). 
Further discussion on the questionnaire and variable calculation employed in this study is 
laid out in the Research Design and Methods Chapter.  
 
2.5.2 Subjective Norm 
     In addition to a person’s own attitudes towards a behaviour, the attitudes of other 
people and groups will influence that person’s choices and behaviour through the social 
pressures of norms. The TPB represents these norms with the person’s internal beliefs 
about them and are called subjective norms. Like the attitude toward the behaviour, 
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which is formed by multiple beliefs, subjective norms are formed by the beliefs about 
what many different groups might think about the behaviour. Similar to the different 
beliefs that create an attitude that people find important, different referents (i.e. 
influential people and groups), which build the subjective norm, are considered more or 
less important from person to person. Therefore the same approach is taken to find the 
salient modal referents through preliminary study (Ajzen 1991, Ajzen 2006). 
     Using the same formula as the Expectancy – Value Model, subjective norms can be 
calculated from survey questions that identify two types of beliefs about each modal 
referent. These beliefs are the normative expectations of others, called the normative 
belief strength (i.e. how strongly the person feels the referent would approve or 
disapprove of the behaviour), and the motivation to comply with that referent’s 
expectations of them. These two beliefs then interact to form the normative belief about 
the referent. The expectancy – value formula for the subjective norms can then be 
illustrated in equation 2.2: 
              (2.2) 
where the normative beliefs (nm) are the products of the normative belief strength (n) and 
motivation to comply (m) to their respective referents (i), and are then summed together 
to approximate the Subjective Norm (SN). The questionnaire statements for normative 
belief strength ask the respondent how supportive they think certain referents would be of 
performing a certain activity, answered on a 1 to 7 scale. The level of motivation to 
comply with what that referent thinks is also answered on a 1 to 7 scale. These scales can 
be found in the methods chapter. 
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2.5.3 Perceived Behavioural Control 
     The final factor that Ajzen (1991) includes in his TPB is the Perceived Behavioural 
Control (PBC). This factor is what distinguishes the TPB from its predecessor, the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). The factors in the TRA 
include only the attitude towards the behaviour and subjective norms, where the TPB 
recognises that there are actual physical and systematic barriers that may prevent or 
promote certain behaviour despite what the person’s attitude or the social norms dictate 
should be done.  As shown in figure 2.1, intentions to behave as well as Actual 
Behavioural Controls are what influence actual behaviour. However, much like actual 
behaviour, Actual Behavioural Control is often hard to measure and incorporate into a 
simple formula. However, the perceived beliefs about Actual Behavioural Controls will 
have an effect on one’s intention to behave. If someone believes there will be road blocks 
inhibiting a certain behaviour and that these blocks will be powerful, the person will be 
less likely to intend to do it. So it is this Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC) that 
influences intention to behave. 
     The PBC, like the other two factors in TPB, use the expectancy – value formula to 
compute the internal beliefs about what might have control over the behaviour. A 
questionnaire can address the two beliefs from the formula that creates the PBC by asking 
about the expectancy that something will inhibit or facilitate the behaviour (behavioural 
control strength) and how powerful they think that control would influence their actual 
behaviour (behavioural control power). Also like the other two factors in the TPB, 
preliminary investigation can be used to find the salient behavioural control beliefs. The 
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salient belief items are then added into the converted expectancy – value formula for PBC 
shown in equation 2.3; 
                (2.3) 
where the control beliefs (cp) are the products of behavioural control strength (c) and 
behavioural control power (p) for their respective salient control beliefs items (i), and are 
summed together to form an approximation of PBC. The wording of the questionnaire 
statements and scales used for answering are found in the methods chapter. 
 
2.5.4 Behavioural Intention 
     As mentioned above, the information on actual behaviour is sometimes difficult to 
acquire. When dealing with prediction of behaviour where the behaviour has yet to been 
completed, researchers must rely on the antecedent of actual behaviour: behavioural 
intention. Through the TPB, behavioural intention can be calculated by summing together 
equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of the model’s three variable into equation 2.4, which 
simplifies to equation 2.5: 
                         (2.4) 
                   (2.5) 
where Behavioural Intention (BI) is equal to the sum of the Attitude towards the 
Behaviour (AB), Subjective Norms (SN) , and Perceived Behavioural Control (PBC). 
Without access to actual Behaviour (B), BI can then be used as a proxy. The TPB has 
been shown to predict behavioural intention better than actual behaviour. In a meta- 
analysis of the TPB, the model accounted for 12% more variance explained for 
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behavioural intention than actual behaviour, with R
2
 values of 39% and 27% respectively 
(Armitage and Conner 2001).  
 
2.5.5 Additional Variables 
     With the TPB being an expansion of the TRA, Ajzen (1991) states that it is open to 
further expansion if the variables can be proven to fit empirically and theoretically. 
Researchers have been able to add additional variables beyond the three core variables of 
the TPB, providing increased explanation of variance in their studies. The inclusion of 
past behaviour, moral obligation (Ajzen 1991, Conner and Armitage 1998), and self-
efficacy (Conner and Armitage 1998, Corbett 2002) to the TPB is a common practice, as 
these additional variables tend to capture a significant amount of variance in the intention 
to behave or the actual behaviour itself. Although past behaviour does not cause future 
behaviour, people may have had similar experiences in the past or have formed a 
behavioural habit, which makes their decision making simpler and less reliant on the 
other TPB variables (Ajzen 1991, Conner and Armitage 1998). Fielding et al. (2005) 
found past behaviour, with a positive coefficient, to be the most important predictor of 
landowners’ intentions to participate in riparian land management using a TPB model. 
However, past behaviour had a negative coefficient when explaining riparian protection 
in the study by Corbett et al. (2002) using the TPB. The negative effect of past riparian 
protection on the intention to participate in future protection was speculated to be the 
result of landowners thinking no further protection was needed on their part.  
     Moral obligation, or moral norms, considers the personal feelings of moral 
responsibility, in addition to the social pressures of the subjective norms and attitudes 
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about the behaviour, to perform or refuse to perform a certain behaviour (Ajzen 1991). 
The moral obligation relates to one’s self-identity; behaving, or intending to behave, 
against that identity would be unlikely as it creates internal conflicts (Conner and 
Armitage 1998). Finally, self-efficacy as described by Corbett (2002) is the belief that 
one’s actions make a difference on the overall environmental quality. Generally, people 
intend to engage in behaviours if they possess self-efficacy or feel they will make a 
difference, which is theoretically different from the internal or external constraints or 
facilitators of PBC that effect one’s ability to perform a task (Conner and Armitage 
1998). 
 
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
     The concepts of value orientations, beliefs, and the TPB discussed above were 
integrated into a conceptual framework to provide a guide for this research to understand 
landowners’ willingness to participate in MBI programs for ES provision. Included in the 
framework are the three spheres of investigation: 1) landowner value orientations, 2) the 
effect of VOs and non-payment benefits on the landowners’ willingness to participate in 
MBI programs for ES provision, and 3) factors affecting the landowners’ agreement with 
the use of these programs (Figure 2.2).  
     In the first sphere, landowners are organised into VO groups based on the values 
Maybery et al. (2005) proposed as the most important in farmers’ land management 
decisions. With values, and therefore VOs, influencing all beliefs and actions lower in the 
value-attitude-behaviour hierarchy, Sphere One is shown to overlap with the other two 
spheres of investigation. The VOs are an integral part of the second sphere as they are 
identified to see how they influence landowners’ willingness to participate (measured in 
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the landowners’ minimum financial compensation required to participate) in a MBI 
program providing financial incentives for ES provision. Furthermore, it is hypothesized 
that non-payment benefits from participating in the MBI programs, which help provide 
the ideal end goals environmental, economic, and lifestyle values aim to achieve, will 
also affect the landowners’ willingness to participate in the programs. Finally, the arrow 
running from the VOs through the non-payment benefits shows that the willingness of the 
landowners should differ depending on which non-payment benefit is provided, base on 
the VO group the landowners belong to.  
     The third sphere is also influenced by the VOs, but because of the relationship 
between values and attitude, the attitudes are assumed to have a more direct influence on 
behavioural intention, so the VOs are shown to have an indirect influence with a dashed 
arrow. This section of the model is an adapted version of the TPB, where behavioural, 
normative, and control beliefs, as well as the additional variables of moral obligation, 
self-efficacy, past behaviour and personal and land characteristics can be used to predict 
one’s behavioural intention. In this case, behavioural intention is identified with the 
landowner’s agreement with the use of MBIs to increase ES provision for the protection 
of water quality. 
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Figure 2.2: Adapted TPB for the agreement with the use of MBIs and the 
willingness of landowners in different value orientation groups to supply ES affected 
by different incentives  
 
2.7 Summary 
     The purpose of this chapter was two-fold: first to provide context of water and 
environmental issues occurring in southern Alberta, and how MBIs for ES provision may 
help alleviate them; and second, to discuss how landowners’ decisions are governed by 
their values and attitudes. Southern Alberta, by nature, has a limited water supply but 
irrigation has helped to make agriculture a prosperous business in the region. Non-point 
source pollution from these agricultural activities and over allocation of the water 
resources puts aquatic and riparian ecosystems at risk of further environmental 
degradation. MBIs have been shown to produce similar results as command and control 
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environmental policies while allowing flexibility for the participants to achieve the goals 
in a cost efficient manner. The voluntary approach of MBIs is more politically viable in 
Alberta, so the WFL and LUF aim to utilise them to provide the ES the province needs 
and to protect water quality and ecosystems health. Whether the landowners support the 
use of these MBIs and plan to participate in them requires looking into what drives their 
actions. 
     The second area of discussion in this chapter was how landowners’ willingness to 
participate in MBI programs for ecosystem service provision is shaped by a system of 
beliefs that guide decision making processes. Behaviour is directly influenced by one’s 
attitude towards it, and indirectly influenced by the person’s values, which are what form 
attitudes. This relationship is known as the Value-Attitude-Behaviour Hierarchy. Within 
this hierarchy also fits value orientations between values and attitudes. Value orientations 
are simplifications of the interactions of values for certain situations. Identifying groups 
of landowners by their value orientation will help in tailoring MBIs that reflect their 
values and thereby make them more willing to participate, but examining their attitudes 
will help in the understanding of their detailed behaviour when it comes to participating 
in such a program. The TPB explains specific behaviour through examining the attitudes 
towards the behaviour, beliefs about social norms, and physical and systematic controls 
on performing the behaviour. Additional variables such as past behaviour, moral 
obligation, self-efficacy, and socio-demographic variables also can be added to the TPB 
in order to increase its explanatory power.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
     This chapter discusses the approaches used to acquire and analyze data pertaining to 
the willingness of rural landowners to provide ecosystem services, within the context of 
the WFL goals, assuming the aid of market-based instruments in southern Alberta. A 
description of the study area is provided, then the chapter discusses the process of data 
collection and questionnaire development. Finally it concludes with a description of the 
methods used to analyse the data. 
 
3.1 Study Area 
     This section provides a brief overview of the geography of southern Alberta, with a 
focus on the Oldman River Basin (ORB) in which the study area of the Municipal 
District of Willow Creek and the County of Lethbridge are located (Figure 3.1). Much of 
southern Alberta is classified as having a semi-arid climate. The region is largely situated 
in the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB), which has a mean annual precipitation  
ranging from 476 mm per year in Banff to 335 mm per year in Medicine Hat (AMEC 
2009). Irrigation networks were developed in the early 20
th
 century to provide the 
agricultural lands with water from rivers that are supplied mostly from snow melt in the 
eastern slopes of the Rocky Mountains (GoA 2000). 
     The ORB is a sub-basin of the SSRB and it makes up the south western corner of the 
province with part of its head waters coming in from Montana. The basin covers a total 
area of about 28,000 km
2
. It is home to over 160,000 people living on farms, within 20 
settlements under 10,000 people, and in the City of Lethbridge, which contains about half 
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of the basin’s population (Ivey et al. 2006). Within the basin, human activity includes 
forestry, recreation, and oil and gas developments in the western portion, while 
agriculture dominates the middle to eastern portion of the basin. Overall, about one third 
of the land cover is agricultural, but excluding the headwaters in the eastern slopes, 
agriculture represents over 50% of the land use cover (Rock and Mayer 2006). The vast 
majority of licensed water in the basin (88%) goes to agriculture, with 87% of that 
licensed water allocated to the irrigated 32% of the cropland (Rock and Mayer 2006). 
Additionally, the ORB accounts for a large amount of Alberta’s intensive livestock 
operations, with about 75% of the province’s beef for slaughter (Rock and Mayer 2006). 
     The study area for this research, however, is only a section of the ORB.  It includes 
the Municipal District of Willow Creek (MDWC) and the County of Lethbridge (COL), 
which are two neighbouring districts that lie almost entirely within the ORB (Figure 3.1). 
The combination of both districts allows for a good representation of the different land 
uses in the ORB. The COL contains parts of the St. Mary and Lethbridge Northern 
irrigation districts, which contain intensive cropland and some of the highest 
concentrations of intensive livestock operations in the country (Little 2003). On the other 
hand, the MDWC contains private irrigation, less intensive dryland farming, and larger 
ranches as the MD enters the foothill to the west. According to the 2006 Census, the 
MDWC and the COL combined had 4538 private residential dwellings (GoA 2010a, 
GoA 2010b). This number can then be used as a proxy for potential number of rural 
landowners. Within both the MDWC and the COL there have been a number of studies 
on water quality within the watersheds of the ORB (Miller et al. 2009, Koning et al. 
 39 
 
2006, Hyland et al. 2003, Rock and Mayer 2004, Rock and Mayer 2006, Rodvang et al. 
2004, Lorenz 2008), so the water quality is a well-known concern in both districts. 
     In the Oldman River and its tributaries, water quality monitoring has shown total 
phosphorous and total nitrogen concentrations, and levels of fecal coliforms that are 
occasionally in excess of the Alberta Surface Water Quality Guidelines (Saffran 2005). In 
the eastern parts a number of artificial canals dispose drainage water into the tributaries. 
They are therefore affected heavily by intensive agriculture and exceed the guidelines 
more often and to a higher degree than the main river (Saffran 2005, GoA 2003b, Ivey et 
al. 2006). In general, the southern Albertan landscape has been greatly altered over the 
last century as a result of the expansion of irrigation and intensive livestock. Therefore, 
there is a pressing need to design water quality improvement policies in order to prevent 
further deterioration of water quality in this intensive agricultural region. Furthermore, it 
is important to know how landowners will react to policies that implement MBIs for ES 
provision. 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Oldman River Basin, Municipal District of Willow Creek and 
Lethbridge County. Modified from Ivey et al. (2006) 
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3.2 Data Collection 
     The primary data was collected with a questionnaire conducted through computer-
assisted phone interviews with the landowners. Preliminary semi-structured, personal 
interviews with local landowners were conducted beforehand to inform the development 
of the questionnaire and uncover local insights. The participants in these personal 
interviews were recruited by contacting the local municipal district offices, the Battersea 
Drain Watershed Group, local agricultural businesses, bed and breakfasts, and 
community clubs and organizations. In total, nine rural landowners agreed to participate 
as well as a rural extension specialist for one of the municipal districts. An attempt was 
made to vary the interviewees based on their land use, in order to uncover different 
opinions and issues. The types of these landowners included, either solely or in 
combination, of: beef, dairy, poultry, or pork producers; irrigated crop or dry land 
farmers; landowners who no longer farm but rent the land to other agricultural uses; a bed 
and breakfast owner, and; an acreage owner never directly tied to farming other than 
raising horses. Responses from these landowners, as well as the literature, helped inform 
the development process of the questionnaire script.  
     Advanis, a marketing research company in Edmonton, was hired to conduct the 
computer-assisted phone survey. Their professionally trained phone interviewers were 
provided with the questionnaire script and a list of 4845 potential rural landowners.  
Since no list of rural landowners could be obtained without offending privacy laws, 
postal codes servicing rural areas within the study area were identified and list brokers 
provided the phone numbers that corresponded to those postal codes. Many of the postal 
codes also serve towns and communities containing people who are not rural landowners, 
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so phone numbers linked to street addresses were removed from the list, but other non-
rural residents with blank or P.O. Box addresses could not be removed. Therefore, 
screening questions to determine whether or not the respondents were rural landowners in 
the MDWC or COL, over 18 years of age, and the long term decision maker on the land 
were asked. The survey was conducted in November and December 2010 and all of the 
numbers were called at least once. In total, 1677 were found or assumed to be eligible 
households for the study and 350 full interviews questionnaires were completed, resulting 
in a 20.9% response rate. 
 
3.3 Interviews and Questionnaires 
     As stated before, preliminary, semi-structured interviews with nine rural landowners 
and one rural extension specialist were conducted in order to inform the questionnaire 
design.  The first 12 questions of the preliminary interviews (Appendix I) were designed 
to discover information about the landowners, the land itself, and some of the 
landowner’s attitudes and beliefs towards different policy options around environmental 
land management and ES. Question 10 linked the ES questions that followed to water 
issued by providing context of the WFL goals and how provision of ES are important to 
the supply of quality water needed to meet those goals. The last 12 questions about ES 
were used to create the TPB statements for the questionnaire.  
     Following Ajzen’s method for forming TPB questionnaire statements (Ajzen 2006), 
Questions 13 to 21 were used to obtain lists of modal beliefs about: (i) what the 
landowners thought the advantages and disadvantages of supplying ES on their property 
are to identify behavioural beliefs; (ii) which individuals or groups would approve or 
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disapprove of supplying ES on their land to identify normative beliefs, and; (iii) what 
factors or circumstances would enable or make it difficult to supply ES on their land to 
identify control beliefs. The questions used to discover the above can be found in 
preliminary interview schedule (Appendix I) as questions 13 to 15, 16 to 18, and 19 to 21 
respectively.  
     The questionnaire contained six sections: A) value statements; B) ES and policy 
preference statements; C) TPB statements; D) extended TPB statements; E) willingness 
to supply ES scenarios, and; F) personal and land characteristics (see Appendix II). The 
value statements of Section A come in two types: individual statements about economic, 
environmental, or lifestyle values and comparative statements pairing one type of value 
against the other. Nine individual value statements were adapted from Maybery et al. 
(2005) and (Kuehne 2008), with economic, environmental and lifestyle values being 
represented by three statements each (Table 3.1). Unlike the individual value statements 
where it’s possible to answer the same for all value types, the comparative statements 
(Table 3.1) make the respondent think about trade-offs between two of the three value 
factors when they manage their land, resulting in a differentiation between the three main 
values. All of the value statements were answered on a seven point Likert scale of 
agreement, with 1 meaning strongly disagreeing, 7 strongly agree, and 4 neither agree nor 
disagree or no opinion. These statements were used in the first sphere of research to 
identify the value orientations (VO) of the landowners.  
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Table 3.1: Value Statements 
Category Statement Original 
Economic value A maximum annual financial return from 
your property is your most important aim. 
A maximum annual return from my 
property is my most important aim. 
(Maybery et al. 2005) 
Increasing the asset value or net worth of 
your land is very important to you. 
Increasing the asset value or net worth of 
the farm is very important to me. (Kuehne 
2008) 
You view your land as first and foremost a 
business investment. 
I view my farm as first and foremost a 
business enterprise. (Maybery et al. 2005) 
Environmental 
value 
Managing environmental problems on your 
land is a high priority. 
Managing environmental problems on my 
farm is a very high priority. (Maybery et 
al. 2005) 
Your right to do what you want with your 
property has to be balanced against wider 
environmental concerns. 
My right to do what I want with my 
property has to be balanced against wider 
environmental concerns. (Kuehne 2008) 
The most important thing is leaving your 
property in better shape than you found it. 
The most important thing is leaving my 
property in better shape that I found it. 
(Maybery et al. 2005) 
Lifestyle value The lifestyle that comes with living in a 
rural area is very important to you. 
The lifestyle that comes with being on the 
farm is very important to me. (Maybery et 
al. 2005) 
For you, a rural environment is a better 
place to live than an urban environment. 
Farming communities are a great place to 
live. (Maybery et al. 2005) 
Rural communities are a great place to live 
and raise a family. 
A rural environment is a great place to raise 
children. (Maybery et al. 2005) 
Value comparison When faced with decisions that affect the 
way you manage your land, economic 
factors tend to outweigh lifestyle 
considerations. 
N/A 
When faced with decisions that affect the 
way you manage your land, economic 
factors tend to outweigh environmental 
concerns. 
N/A 
When faced with decisions that affect the 
way you manage your land, environmental 
concerns tend to outweigh lifestyle 
considerations. 
N/A 
Responses: 1=‘strongly disagree’, 2, 3, 4=‘neither agree nor disagree’, 5, 6, 7=‘strongly agree’ 
 
     Section B of the survey instrument assesses what landowners think about ES, MBIs 
and general policy preferences. The statements use the same Likert scale as the previous 
value statements and most were attached to the questionnaire for purposes of another 
researcher. However, the introductory statements for the sub-sections did provide 
information and context needed for the remainder of the survey. In subsection B2, a 
broad definition of ES was provided as “[...] a term that collectively represents all the free 
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services humans receive from nature, including clean water and air, crops, wood, flood 
protection, soil regeneration, and aesthetic and recreational values.” Context within the 
County of Lethbridge and Municipal District of Willow Creek was then provided that 
poor water quality can reduce the provision of these ES, stressing the importance of the 
local water resources and the related ES. Furthermore, in subsection B3a, how MBIs use 
financial incentives and disincentives to promote or dissuade behaviour or land 
management techniques was explained, with examples of the types of mechanism used. 
Finally, in subsection B3b, the use of MBIs was put into a water quality protection and 
ES provision context and the landowners were asked to indicate their level of agreement 
with the statements: 
a) As fertilizer run-off contributes to water quality issues, market-based instruments should be 
used to provide incentives to change land management practices to reduce run-off. 
 
b) As buffer zones in specific areas can help limiting run-off and thereby improve water 
quality, market-based instruments should be used to provide incentives to install 
buffer zones. 
 The MBI in the first statement would provide incentive to adopt Beneficial Management 
Practices (BMPs) that would prevent the loss of ES from further reduced water quality, 
and in the second statement it would do so to adopt BMPs that increase ES provision to 
prevent water quality issues. Following Fielding et al. (2005), averaging the responses of 
these two statements together can create an index for the landowners’ general agreement 
with the use of MBIs for ES provision, which was used as the dependent variable in the 
third sphere of research. Although the remainder of the questionnaire was open to the 
interpretation of providing many types of ES, the context provided in this section was 
meant to bring ES provision for purposes water quality protection to the forefront of the 
respondents’ minds.  
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     Section C comprises of the TPB statements based on the modal, or most common, 
beliefs from the landowners in the preliminary interviews following the method laid out 
in Ajzen (2006). These variables were used as independent variables in the third sphere 
of research. Subsection C1 contains the behavioural beliefs that form the Attitude 
Towards the Behaviour. Eight items were produced from the preliminary interviews to 
represent the common issues that affect one’s attitude toward the behaviour of protecting 
ES on one’s land: i) environmental quality, ii) limited resources, iii) pride in land 
management, iv) economic benefits, v) reduced competitiveness, vi) protecting future 
generations, vii) increased paperwork and red tape, and viii) benefits to society. To assess 
the behavioural belief strength (b), the respondents were asked to respond with the seven 
point Likert scale of agreement to statements using the items above such as, “It will help 
to improve environmental quality, such as habitat, or water and air quality”. For outcome 
evaluations (e), the respondents were asked to rate, on a scale of one to seven, how 
desirable the items in the previous list would be as outcomes (e.g., “A healthy 
environment”) of performing the behaviour in question.   
     Subsection C2 used a list of six modal referents to assess the normative beliefs that 
make up the Subjective Norms. The referents identified from the interviews were: i) 
family, ii) government, iii) people working in the environmental field, iv) neighbours and 
peers, v) recreational users of the land, and vi) members of the agricultural community 
and organizations. The normative belief strength (n) statements asked the respondents to 
agree or disagree to the referents thinking that making changes to the respondent’s land 
management for the provision of ES would be a good idea, and the motivation to comply 
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(m) statements asked the respondent to express the degree to which they would want to 
comply with the referents.  
     Subsection C3 concludes the use of the modal beliefs supplied by the interviewees in 
the preliminary interviews. To assess the control beliefs that might have influence over 
whether or not the respondent could successfully conduct land management changes for 
the provision of ES, the five modal items were: i) not having a clear understanding of the 
total impacts of an action, ii) external economic forces, iii) the physical characteristics of 
the land, iv) the weather, and v) having time and money committed elsewhere. The two 
sets of statements assessing these factors are the control belief strength (c) and control 
belief power (p) statements, where the former asks for the agreement level to a claim that 
the factor is likely to be influential, and the latter asks about the added level of ease or 
difficulty the factor would present in making those land management changes.  
     Section D includes four statements that assess the additional explanatory variables 
often included with TPB studies referred to earlier in Chapter 2. Only one statement each 
for moral obligation and self-efficacy are used, however, past behaviour uses two. The 
first is to assess whether or not landowners have changed land management practices in 
the past on their own accord, and the other asks if they have participated in organized 
programs to change land management for environmental benefit. All statements use the 
seven point Likert scale of agreement for the responses. These statements were used as 
independent variables in the third sphere of research. 
     Section E contains four scenarios aimed at identifying the minimum financial 
compensation landowners would be willing to accept in order to participate in a MBI 
program for ES provision. The scenarios using different combinations of perceived 
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benefits from participating in a hypothetical MBI land management program to provide 
ES were: 1) environmental benefits only; 2) environmental and lifestyle benefits; 3) 
environmental and economic benefits, and; 4) a combination of all three perceived non-
payment benefits. Since potential land management varies for different types of 
landowners, the hypothetical MBI program was ambiguous, allowing the landowner to 
imagine it relative to their land. The respondents were asked to imagine the financial 
burden they would expect to endure if they were to change their land management, and 
then to state the minimum financial compensation they would expect from a MBI in 
percentage of their personal costs from making the change (i.e., “No incentive or 0% of 
your cost covered”, “Some of your costs covered, so 50% or less but greater than 0%”, 
“Most of your costs covered, so greater than 50% but less than 100%”, “Full 
compensation, 100%”, “More than full compensation of your costs, so greater than 
100%”, and “The threat of a fine”). These scenarios, as well as the values orientations 
derived from the statements in Section A, were used for the second sphere of research.  
     Section F includes the socio-demographic questions about the landowners and the 
descriptions of the land and operations conducted on it. The personal socio-demographic 
questions include: i) sex, ii) age, iii) marital status, iv) number of children, v) highest 
level of education, vi) year of education completion, vii) approximate household income, 
viii) place of upbringing (i.e., being raised urban or rural), and ix) political orientation. 
The land characteristics included: i) how much household income is derived from use of 
the land (in percentage terms), ii) number of acres owned, iii) primary uses of the land, 
iv) number of generations of family that has owned the land, and v) the landowner’s 
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expectation for farm succession (see Appendix II for response options). These variables 
were use in the first and third spheres. 
 
3.4 Methods of Analysis 
     The phone surveying company provided the responses to the questionnaire in a SPSS 
data set. The raw data was cleaned, inconsistencies were verified with audio files of the 
interviews, and responses were recoded into usable variables for the statistical analysis. 
The three spheres of investigation required different methods of statistical analysis. In the 
first sphere, cluster analysis was used to identify the VOs of the landowners. In the 
second sphere, crosstabs and ANOVA tests were used to discover the differences in 
landowners’ willingness to participate in MBI programs for ES provision, according to 
their VO and the additional non-payment benefits gained. Finally, in the third sphere of 
research, regression analysis was undertaken to identify factors important to landowners’ 
level of agreement to the use of MBIs for ES provision.  
 
3.4.1 Sphere One: Value Orientations 
     The objective in the first sphere was to discover if landowners could be grouped based 
on the values that influence their land management decisions. The first hypothesis was 
that landowners do not have uniform values informing their land management and instead 
they can be organised into distinct VO groups. Using the three comparative value 
statements (A10, A11, and A12), multiple agglomerative hierarchical cluster analyses 
were performed with different seeding cases through randomizations of the order of cases 
in the data set, to produce multiple unique dendrograms. The common number of natural 
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clusters was then entered into K-means clustering to produce clusters with greater 
stability than those found by the agglomerative hierarchical clustering procedure. 
ANOVA was used to test for a significant difference between the responses of the cluster 
groups to the three comparative value statements and the Tukey post hoc tests was used 
to determine if there were significant differences between each of the groups. The result 
from these tests as well as ANOVAs and Tukey tests conducted on the remaining nine 
value statements, representing economic, environmental, or lifestyle values, were used to 
label the VOs of each cluster group.  
     The second hypothesis was that members of the VO groups have different personal 
and land characteristics. This was tested using ANOVA and the Tukey tests on numerical 
variables to identify significant difference between the VO groups, and cross-tabulation 
and chi-square tests for nominal and ordinal variables. The variables tested are outlined in 
Table 3.2, which lists personal characteristics of the landowners, and in Table 3.3, which 
lists characteristics of the landholdings. 
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Table 3.2: Personal Characteristics of Landowners 
Variable Descriptions Analyses Values 
Sex Sex of the respondent 0 = male 
1 = female 
Age  Respondent’s age in years Numerical 
Marital status Respondent’s marital 
status:  
1 = single and never married; 2 = legally married; 3 
= common-law; 4 = separated; 5 = divorced; 6 = 
widowed 
Regression recoding: 0 = single (1, 4, 5, 6); 1 = 
coupled (2, 3) 
Children Number of children Numerical 
Education Respondent’s highest level 
of education  
1 = No certificate, diploma or degree; 2 = 
Secondary (highschool) diploma or equivalency 
certificate; 3 = College or other non-university 
certificate diploma (including apprenticeship or 
trade); 4 = University Bachelor’s degree; 5 = 
University Master’s or Doctorate degree 
Regression recoding: 0 = non-university (1, 2, 3); 1 
= university (4, 5) 
Experience Time since completion of 
education 
Numerical 
Place of upbringing Rural or urban upbringing 0 = rural 
1 = urban 
Political ideology Right, centre, or left 
leaning 
1 = right; 2 = centre; 3 = left 
Regression recoding: right leaning as dummy 
variable 
Household income Approximate net annual 
household income in 
dollars 
Numerical 
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of Landholdings 
Variable Descriptions Analyses Values 
Income from land use Percentage of net income 
derived from land use 
1 = 0% to 25%; 2 = 25% to 50%; 3 = 50% to 75%; 
4 = 75% to 100% 
Regression recoding: 1 = 12.5; 2 = 37.5; 3 = 62.5; 4 
= 87.5 
Land size Acres owned by 
respondent 
Numerical (log transformed) 
Crop production A primary purpose of the 
land is for crop production 
0 = none 
1 = dryland farming, irrigation farming within an 
irrigation district, private irrigation farming, 
specialty crops, and/or other 
Animal production A primary purpose of the 
land is for livestock 
purposes 
0 = none 
1 = beef, poultry, pork, dairy, and/or other 
Agricultural 
production 
A primary purpose of the 
land is for agricultural 
purposes 
0 = none 
1 = yes to crop and/or animal production 
Agricultural related 
business 
A primary purpose of the 
land is for business that 
supports agriculture 
0 = none 
1 = yes 
Renting land to 
agricultural users 
A primary purpose of the 
land is to rent to others for 
agricultural purposes 
0 = no 
1= yes 
Personal recreation A primary purpose of the 
land is for personal 
recreation 
0 = no 
1= yes 
Residence A primary purpose of the 
land is as a place of 
residence 
0 = no 
1= yes 
Generations of family 
owning the land 
Number of generations the 
land has been owned in the 
same family 
Numerical 
Succession to family Plans of succession to the 
next generation in the 
family 
1 = land will be passed down 
2 = land will not be passed down 
3 = unsure of succession  
  
3.4.2 Sphere Two: Minimum Compensation Requirements for Participation in MBI 
Programs for ES Provision  
     The two research objectives in the second sphere of investigation were to discover 
how landowners’ willingness to participate in MBI programs for ES provision differs 
between VO groups, and whether that willingness is affected by economic, lifestyle, and 
environmental non-payment benefits. Using the MBI program non-payment benefit 
scenarios (E1, E2, E3, and E4), crosstabulation and ANOVA were employed to test for 
statistical differences in the financial compensation required by landowners to participate. 
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The financial compensation was expressed in percentage of the costs the landowners 
expect they would face and would want returned in some way in order to participate in 
MBI programs for ES. 
     Hypothesis 3 states that members of each VO group require a different financial 
compensation. To test this, and since the financial compensation collected was in 
percentage ranges, and therefore ordinal, crosstab and chi-square tests were also used to 
identify if there were difference between response distributions according to VO groups. 
Converting the ordinal minimum compensation data into representative values and 
creating means allowed ANOVA and Tukey tests to be run. The response of “no 
compensation (0%)” was represented by a value of 0, the 1-50% range of compensation 
was represented with the midpoint value of 25, the 50-99% range of compensation was 
represented by the midpoint value of 75, “full compensation (100%)” was represented by 
the value of 100, and greater than full compensation was represented by a value of 125. 
The ANOVA was used to confirm the chi-square results, and the Tukey test was used to  
identify between which VO groups the mean financial incentives differed. Hypothesis 4, 
which states that the MBI scenarios with different non-payment benefits will create 
different distributions in the landowners’ willingness to participate, was tested in the 
same manner, except the sample was tested as a whole to compare the separate scenarios 
in the crosstabs and ANOVA tests.  
     To test the last hypothesis in this sphere of investigation some additional steps were 
required. Hypothesis 5 states that the changes in financial compensation required by 
landowners to participate caused by the different benefit scenarios vary between the VO 
groups. The first test was to include all of the responses to the four scenarios in one two-
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way ANOVA to test the interaction between scenario and VO group. The second set of 
tests followed the same procedure as for the two hypotheses above, except the crosstabs 
and ANOVAs were run for each VO group individually against the benefit scenarios, and 
then for each benefit scenario individually against the VO groups. This allowed the 
relationships between the VO groups and benefit Scenarios to be examined more closely. 
 
3.4.3 Sphere Three: TPB and Other Variables that Influence Landowners’ 
Willingness to Agree with the Use of MBIs Programs for ES Provision 
     The final objective of this thesis, undertaken in the third sphere of investigation, was 
to discover the personal, land, and situational factors that most strongly influence 
landowners’ willingness to participate in MBI programs for ES provision to protect water 
quality. Hypothesis 6 stated that the TPB variables will be significant in explaining the 
variance of the landowners’ agreement that MBIs should be used for ES provision, and 
this was tested using linear regression analysis.  
     For the dependent variable, an index was created for the general agreement with the 
use of MBIs for ES provision by averaging the responses to the two individual statements 
B3b-a and B3b-b. The dependent variable retained the original 1 to 7 scale of agreement, 
but allowed for half points on the scale. However, because of the response distribution, 
the dependent variable required a natural logarithmic transformation to provide a more 
normalised distribution. 
     The independent variables include the eight behavioral belief, six normative belief, 
and five control belief items from the TPB, the four expanded TPB statements, 
membership of the three VO groups, and twenty personal and land description variables 
(see Table 3.3. and Table 3.4 for list). Following Ajzen (1996), the TPB variables were 
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operationalized by calculating the behavioural beliefs by multiplying the strength by 
evaluation (b*e), the normative beliefs by multiplying the strength by motivation to 
comply (n*m), and the control beliefs by multiplying the strength by the power (c*p) (see 
the TPB section in Chapter 2). Transformations and re-codings were made on a number 
of variables to make them more normally distributed and conducive for linear regression 
(see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3).  
     All independent variables were entered in the regression model initially using the 
Enter method, which adds them all simultaneously. The variable with the least 
significance was removed, and the model re-run. This was repeated until removal of any 
of the independent variable would negatively impact the adjusted R
2
 value. Variables 
with correlation issues or missing data (i.e., household income) were also removed from 
the model. After removing variables due to multicolinearity, Cook’s Distance revealed 
that there were many influential, unusual cases. Instead of removing a large portion of the 
sample, the top three cases were removed, the highest of which also had the highest 
leverage, and the other two were the only cases with standardized residuals above a 3.0 z-
score. The results of the analyses for the three spheres of investigation are outlined in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4 RESEARCH RESULTS 
     This chapter presents the data collected via the phone survey and the results from its 
analysis. First, a description of the respondents is provided followed by the results from 
the three spheres of research that addressed the four research objectives. The first sphere 
used cluster analysis to group landowners based on their values and crosstabs and chi-
square tests to identify the value orientations of the groups and provide a description of 
the landowners. The second sphere reports the compensation required by the landowners 
to supply ES through MBI programs and the variation through the different VO groups 
and the scenarios with different non-payment benefits from participation. The third 
sphere reports the results of the regression model that tested the TPB, with its expanded 
variables and additional control factors of land and landowner socio-demographic 
characteristic. The chapter ends with a list of the evidence found that support the 
hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Respondents 
     Of the 350 respondents who provided enough data for analysis, the socio-demographic 
data revealed that the respondents were reasonably representative of the population in the 
area with the exception of age and sex. This result was expected as this survey focused on 
landowners and/or main decision makers of land who tend to be male and older. The 
socio-demographic data can be seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Table 4.1 contains the count 
and percentage of the total number of respondents for each variable. The variables 
included are sex, level of education, being a producer (which is further broken into 
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producing crops and producing animals), the percentage of the household income derived 
from use of their land (in ranges of 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, and 75-100%), location of 
childhood upbringing (rural or urban), number of generations the family has owned the 
land, and the likelihood of succession of the land to the next generation. Table 4.2 
provides the total numbers of respondents who reported their age, approximate net annual 
household income, and the amount of acres owned, as well as the minimum and 
maximum values, means, standard deviations, and variance for those variables. In 
addition to the data about income in Table 4.2, about 17% of the sample reported an 
approximate annual net household income of less than $50,000 (CND), 33% reported 
between $50000 and $100000, 26% reported greater than $100000, and 23.7 percent 
declined to provide an income to the interviewers.   
 
Table 4.1: Socio-Demographic and Land Data (Nominal and Ordinal Data) 
Descriptor N % 
Sex 350  
Male 238 68.0 
Female 
 
112 32.0 
Education 345  
No certificate, diploma or degree 33 9.6 
High school diploma or equivalency certificate 88 25.5 
College or other non-university diploma  158 45.8 
University bachelor’s degree 50 14.5 
University Master’s or Doctorate degree 
 
16 4.6 
Producers 299 85.4 
Crops* 235 67.1 
Animals & Livestock* 
 
217 62.0 
% of income from land use 345  
0 -25 169 49.0 
25-50 38 11.0 
50-75 31 9.0 
75-100 107 31.0 
*Not mutually exclusive 
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Table 4.1: Socio-Demographic and Land Data (Nominal and Ordinal Data) (Cont’d) 
Descriptor N % 
Recreational land use 350  
Yes 162 53.7 
No 
 
188 46.3 
Upbringing 350  
Rural 291 83.1 
Urban 
 
59 16.9 
Generations of family owning the land 350  
1 176 50.3 
2 61 17.4 
3 76 21.7 
4+ 
 
37 10.6 
Succession of land to family 350  
Yes 213 60.9 
No 89 25.4 
Unsure 48 13.7 
 
  
Table 4.2: Socio-Demographic and Land Data (Integral Data) 
 
4.2 Value Orientations 
     The first sphere of investigation addressed the first research objective to determine if 
landowners can be organised into separate groups based on the importance they place on 
economic, lifestyle, or environmental values in their land use decision making. Cluster 
analysis was used to test the first hypothesis, which created value orientation groups. 
Crosstabs and chi-square tests show where the significant differences in values between 
groups were. Crosstabs and chi-square tests were also used to test the second hypothesis 
Descriptor N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Age 344 19 89 55.47 12.087 146.104 
Net annual household income ($) 267 10000 1500000 96573.03 133666.59 1.787E10 
Acres owned 339 1 26000 1131.99 3190.13 1.018E7 
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that members of these VO groups will portray different land and personal characteristics 
and the results are provided below.  
 
4.2.1 Value Statement Responses 
     A total of 12 statements were used to identify the VOs of respondents in the survey. 
Three of the statements compare the importance of the economic, environmental, and 
lifestyle factors in land management decisions pairwise. The nine remaining statements 
represented a single aspect of economic, environmental, and lifestyle values. The 
response distribution to these statements for the entire sample can be seen in Table 4.3.  
     In general, the comparative value statements show that landowners tend to put 
economic factors as the primary motives in their land management, with environmental 
concerns second over lifestyle considerations. Statements A10 and A12, with mean 
scores of 4.62 and 4.53, respectively, show that economic and environmental factors take 
priority over lifestyle considerations. Statement A11 shows that the importance between 
economic and environmental factors is fairly balanced with a mean score of 4.08 on the 
Likert scale.  
     For the individual value statements, most received a general level of agreement from 
the respondents, with little disagreement to the environmental and lifestyle statements. 
The respondents showed very little variation in lifestyle with around 75% and 80% of 
them strongly agreeing to each of the three statements. Statements A1 and A7 in the 
economic group, however, had a far more polarizing effect on the respondents, with large 
portions either agreeing or disagreeing (Table 4.3). The breakdown of these responses 
relative to the value orientation groups will be explained below. 
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Table 4.3: Value Statement Responses from Entire Sample 
 % of Responses on Likert Scale of  
Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7) 
Mean 
Likert 
Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Value Comparison Statements 
A10) When faced with decisions that affect 
the way you manage your land, economic 
factors tend to outweigh lifestyle 
considerations. 
6.9 6.9 6.9 19.4 28.0 21.1 10.9 4.62 
A11) When faced with decisions that affect 
the way you manage your land, economic 
factors tend to outweigh environmental 
concerns. 
8.9 9.1 16.0 23.4 21.4 16.6 4.6 4.08 
A12) When faced with decisions that affect 
the way you manage your land, 
environmental concerns tend to outweigh 
lifestyle considerations. 
2.9 5.7 8.3 32.9 26.0 17.7 6.6 4.53 
 
Economic Value Statements 
A1) A maximum annual financial return from 
your property is your most important aim. 
21.7 6.9 5.1 19.4 16.6 13.7 16.6 4.10 
A4) Increasing the asset value or net worth of 
your land is very important to you.  
1.7 1.7 2.6 13.7 19.1 24.9 36.3 5.66 
A7) You view your land as first and foremost 
a business investment.  
16.0 6.0 9.4 16.0 17.1 13.4 22.0 4.40 
 
Environmental Value Statements 
A2) Managing environmental problems on 
your land is a high priority. 
.9 1.1 .6 9.1 15.4 33.7 39.1 5.94 
A6) Your right to do what you want with 
your property has to be balanced against 
wider environmental concerns. 
3.1 3.4 3.4 12.6 20.9 28.0 28.6 5.43 
A9) The most important thing is leaving your 
property in better shape than you found it. 
.0 .3 .0 3.4 5.4 23.1 67.7 6.54 
 
Lifestyle Value Statements 
A3) The lifestyle that comes with living in a 
rural area is very important to you. 
.3 .6 .3 2.0 6.0 16.0 74.9 6.61 
A5) For you, a rural environment is a better 
place to live than an urban environment. 
.0 .3 .3 2.3 2.9 14.3 80.0 6.71 
A8) Rural communities are a great place to 
live and raise a family. 
.0 .0 .3 .9 5.7 17.4 75.7 6.67 
 
 
4.2.2 Clustering of Value Orientation Groups 
     After running the three comparative value statements (A10, A11, and A12) through 
multiple agglomerative hierarchical clustering with randomized seeding, three clusters 
were chosen. The dendrograms illustrated that the different algorithms and seeds 
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produced two to five different clusters from the same data set. Three clusters, however, 
were most common and was the number entered into K-means clustering to produce 
clusters with greater stability than those found in the agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering. Also a three cluster solution is more appropriate for statistical tests. The 
resulting distribution can be seen in Figure 4.1, with one group representing just over half 
of the sample and the other two around a quarter each. The naming process and 
descriptions are in the following sections. 
 
Figure 4.1: Landowner value orientation groups created using cluster analysis on 
the landowner responses to the three comparative value orientation statements. 
 
4.2.3 Value Orientation Group Names and Confirmation 
     The largest cluster contained 54% of the survey respondents. From Table 4.4, this VO 
group: i) had the highest mean level of agreement with the statement that economic 
factors outweigh lifestyle considerations when making land management decisions 
(A10); ii) tended to agree that economic factors outweigh environmental concerns (A11); 
and iii) had the highest mean level of agreement with the statement that environmental 
54% 
21% 
25% 
Value Orientations 
Economic/Environmental 
Economic 
Enviornmental/Lifestyle 
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concerns outweighed lifestyle considerations (A12). These findings suggest that the 
group members are economically focused, but environmentally concerned, thus it was 
labelled as the “Economic/Environmental” VO group. 
     The smallest cluster contained 21% of the respondents and had: i) the highest mean 
level of agreement that economic factors outweigh environmental considerations (A11); 
ii) disagreed with the statement that environmental concerns outweigh lifestyle 
considerations (A12); and iii) agreed that economic factors outweigh lifestyle 
considerations (A10), although to a lesser extent than the Economic/Environmental 
group. Overall, this suggests that the group is economically oriented and not overly 
concerned about the environment.  The label given for this value orientation group was 
simply the “Economic” VO group. 
     The third cluster had 25% of the survey respondents. This group disagreed with the 
two statements valuing economic considerations over environmental (A11) and lifestyle 
considerations (A10). The means shows that it disagreed slightly more with the economic 
over environmental statement than the economic over lifestyle statement, which is 
consistent with the group’s mean response being on the agreeing side of neutral with the 
statement that environmental considerations outweigh lifestyle concerns (A12). The mean 
responses by this group show that it is more environment and lifestyle oriented when 
making land management decisions, thus it was labelled the “Environmental/Lifestyle” 
VO group. 
     The ANOVA tests indicated that differences in the VO groups’ means of the three 
value comparison statements were statistically significant (Table 4.4), so at least one 
group mean was different from the other two. This significance was expected as these 
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statements were the basis for the cluster analysis. The post hoc Tukey test compared the 
means of each group pairwise and showed that all the means were significantly different 
from each other.  
     The differences in the mean responses to all nine individual value statements were 
also statistically significant among the groups based on the ANOVA results. The Tukey 
tests identified between which VO groups the statistically different means occurred. 
Members of the Economic/Environmental and Economic VO groups had the highest and 
second highest mean agreement with all economic value statements (A1, A4, and A7), 
but their differences in the mean agreements are not statistically significant according to 
the Tukey test (Table 4.4). Members of the Environmental/Lifestyle group disagreed with 
the first and third economic value statements about using the land to maximize financial 
return (A1) and considering it as first and foremost a business investment (A7). However, 
they agreed with the importance of increasing the asset value of their land (A4). For each 
of these three statements, the difference in mean responses between the 
Environmental/Lifestyle group and the other two were significantly different. For the 
responses to the environmental statements (A2, A6, and A9), the 
Economic/Environmental and Environmental/Lifestyle VO groups both scored means of 
high agreement and were not significantly different from one another. The means of the 
Economic group were significantly less than the other two for the environmental 
statements, except in A9 where its mean was only significantly less than the 
Economic/Environmental group. For the responses to the lifestyle statements, most 
landowners agreed strongly so there was not much variation. However, there were some 
significant differences in mean responses between members of the Economic group and 
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at least one of the other two VO groups. The above results confirm that the VOs of the 
groups created by the cluster analysis can be identified as economic/environmental 
oriented, solely economic oriented and environmental/lifestyle oriented. In conclusion 
Hypothesis one can be accepted, landowners can be grouped into distinct groups based on 
their value orientation. 
 
Table 4.4: Value Orientation Group Responses and Tests of Value Statements 
  
Value Statements 
Value 
Orientation 
Group N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA 
Mean Difference between 
Value Orientation Groups 
(Tukey Significance) 
F 1 and 2 1 and 3 2 and 3 
Comparisons         
A10) Economic vs. 
Lifestyle 
 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 5.43 1.00 245.22 
*** 
0.33 
* 
  
2.97 
*** 
  
2.64 
*** Econ (2) 75 5.11 1.03 
Envi/Life (3) 88 2.47 1.19 
A11) Economic vs. 
Environment 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 4.48 1.24 148.31 
*** 
-0.74 
*** 
  
2.23 
*** 
  
2.96 
*** Econ (2) 75 5.21 1.14 
Envi/Life (3) 88 2.25 1.13 
A12) Environment 
vs. Lifestyle 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 5.19 0.91 94.79 
*** 
2.04 
*** 
  
0.88 
*** 
  
-1.16 
*** Econ (2) 75 3.15 1.02 
Envi/Life (3) 88 4.31 1.47 
Economic         
A1) Financial 
return 
 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 4.63 1.96 34.45 
***  
0.12 
  
2.02 
*** 
  
1.89 
*** Econ (2) 75 4.51 2.00 
Envi/Life (3) 88 2.61 1.84 
A4) Asset value Econ/Envi (1) 187 5.88 1.26 7.65 
*** 
0.20 
  
0.69 
*** 
  
0.49 
* Econ (2) 75 5.68 1.38 
Envi/Life (3) 88 5.19 1.56 
A7) Business 
investment 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 4.98 1.85 34.40 
*** 
0.31 
  
2.01 
***  
1.70 
*** Econ (2) 75 4.67 1.98 
Envi/Life (3) 88 2.97 1.95 
Economic/Environmental = 1, Economic = 2, Environmental/Lifestyle = 3 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
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Table 4.4: Value Orientation Group Responses and Tests of Value Statements 
(Cont’d) 
  
Value Statements 
Value 
Orientation 
Group N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA 
Mean Difference between 
Value Orientation Groups 
(Tukey Significance) 
F 1 and 2 1 and 3 2 and 3 
Environmental         
A2) Environmental 
Management 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 6.06 1.04 9.08 
*** 
0.61 
*** 
  
-0.06 
  
-0.67 
*** Econ (2) 75 5.45 1.35 
Envi/Life (3) 88 6.13 1.15 
A6) Rights 
Balanced 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 5.61 1.32 6.23 
*** 
0.72 
*** 
  
0.11 
  
-0.61 
** Econ (2) 75 4.89 1.74 
Envi/Life (3) 88 5.50 1.64 
A9) Stewardship  Econ/Envi (1) 187 6.65 0.65 4.76 
*** 
0.32 
*** 
  
0.16 
  
-0.16 
Econ (2) 75 6.33 0.88 
Envi/Life (3) 88 6.49 0.94 
Lifestyle         
A3) Lifestyle 
 
 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 6.61 0.88 2.79 
* 
0.18 
  
-0.13 
  
-0.31 
** Econ (2) 75 6.43 0.98 
Envi/Life (3) 88 6.74 0.60 
A5) Rural better 
than urban 
Econ/Envi (1) 187 6.76 0.58 5.74 
*** 
0.29 
*** 
  
-0.04 
  
-0.33 
*** Econ (2) 75 6.47 1.06 
Envi/Life (3) 88 6.80 0.51 
A8) Community Econ/Envi (1) 187 6.74 0.55 2.50 
* 
0.18 
* 
  
0.12 
  
-0.07 
Econ (2) 75 6.56 0.66 
Envi/Life (3) 88 6.63 0.81 
Economic/Environmental = 1, Economic = 2, Environmental/Lifestyle = 3 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
 
4.2.4 Value Orientation Descriptions 
     Examining the socio-demographic and land characteristic variables, none of the 
groups differed significantly with the following characteristics: i) age, ii) marital status, 
iii) number of children, iv) political leaning, and v) annual household income. However 
the three clusters differed significantly with respect to the following nine characteristic: i) 
sex; ii) education; iii) urban upbringing; iv) recreational land use; v) having some form of 
agricultural land use, which can be broken down into having some type of crop and some 
type of livestock; vi) the income derived from the use of the land;  vii) succession 
expectation; viii) number of acres owned; and ix) the number of generations the family 
had owned the land (Table 4.5). The most substantial differences were between 
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landowners in the Environmental/Lifestyle VO and those in the other two VO groups. In 
conclusion, hypothesis two can be accepted: members of each VO group have different 
land and personal characteristics. 
     In general, those more economically focused were more likely to have the following 
traits: i) be less likely to be female; ii) have college and non-university diplomas; iii) be 
producers with more cropping and livestock; iv) have a greater portion of income from 
land use; v) have a lower importance of recreation as part of land use; vi) had a rural 
upbringing; vii) have had more generations of the family own and operate the land; vii) 
have a higher expectation of land succession to the next generation; and ix) own a large 
number of acres. 
 
Table 4.5: Value Orientation Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptor (Chi-square significance) 
Total Sample Econ/Envi Econ Envi/Life 
N % N % N % N % 
Sex** 350  187  75  88  
Male 238 68.0 127 67.9 59 78.7 52 59.1 
Female 
 
112 32.0 60 32.1 16 21.3 36 40.9 
Education*** 345  186  74  85  
No certificate, diploma or degree 33 9.6 22 11.8 5 6.8 6 7.1 
High school diploma or equivalency certificate 88 25.5 59 31.7 13 17.6 16 18.8 
College or other non-university diploma  158 45.8 85 45.7 40 54.1 33 38.8 
University bachelor’s degree 50 14.5 17 9.1 13 17.6 20 23.5 
University Master’s or Doctorate degree 
 
16 4.6 3 1.6 3 4.1 10 11.8 
Producers*** 299 85.4 167 89.3 67 89.3 65 73.9 
Crops** 235 67.1 127 67.9 57 76.0 51 58.0 
Animals & Livestock* 
 
217 62.0 120 64.2 51 68.0 46 52.3 
% of income from land use*** 345  186  73  86  
0 -25 169 49.0 76 40.9 28 38.4 65 75.6 
25-50 38 11.0 24 12.9 9 12.3 5 5.8 
50-75 31 9.0 21 11.3 8 11.0 2 2.3 
75-100 107 31.0 65 34.9 28 38.4 14 16.3 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01 Note: Crops and Animal production are not mutually exclusive  
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Table 4.5: Value Orientation Descriptive Statistics (Cont’d) 
Descriptor (Chi-square significance) 
Total Sample Econ/Envi Econ Envi/Life 
N % N % N % N % 
Recreational land use*** 350  187  75  88  
Yes 162 53.7 92 49.2 34 45.3 62 70.5 
No 
 
188 46.3 95 50.8 41 54.7 26 29.5 
Upbringing*** 350  187  75  88  
Rural 291 83.1 160 85.6 69 92.0 62 70.5 
Urban 
 
59 16.9 27 14.4 6 8.0 26 29.5 
Generations of family owning the land** 350  187  75  88  
1 176 50.3 88 47.1 32 42.7 56 63.6 
2 61 17.4 36 19.3 11 14.7 14 25.9 
3 76 21.7 43 23.0 23 30.7 10 11.4 
4+ 
 
37 10.6 20 10.7 9 12.0 8 9.1 
Succession of land to family** 350  187  75  88  
Yes 213 60.9 118 63.1 49 65.3 46 52.3 
No 89 25.4 38 20.3 20 26.7 31 35.2 
Unsure 48 13.7 31 16.6 6 8.0 11 12.5 
 
ANOVA 
 
Tukey Significance between Value 
Orientation Groups (difference direction) 
Descriptor F (sig.) 1 and 2 1 and 3 2 and 3 
Log of Acres Owned*** 
 
11.99 (.000) .839 (+) .000 (+) .000 (+) 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01     
 
4.3 Compensation Requirements to Supply ES 
     In this section, the second sphere of investigation addresses the second and third 
research objectives to discover how the willingness of the landowners to participate in 
MBI programs for ES provision is different among the VO groups and if that willingness 
is affected by economic, lifestyle, and environmental benefits. As a measure of their 
willingness to participate, the landowners were asked to state the minimum compensation 
they would accept to adopt the management change (in percentage of what they 
anticipate it would cost them to implement the land management changes).   
     The first set of results  is from the crosstabs and ANOVA that examined the 
compensation requirement differences between the VO groups. The second set of results 
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present the differences in the financial compensation caused by the four scenarios with 
different economic, lifestyle, and environmental non-payment benefits using the same 
analyses. Finally, the third set of results presents the crosstabs and ANOVA tests to 
determine if there is an interaction between the benefit scenarios and membership to VO 
groups on the financial compensation required to participate. These results assess the 
third, forth, and fifth hypotheses, respectively. 
 
4.3.1 Compensation Requirement Differences between Value Orientation Groups 
     To examine the willingness of each VO group to participate in the MBI programs to 
provide ES the responses to the four benefit scenarios were analysed together. The 
Pearson Chi-square analysis (Table 4.6) showed that the levels of compensation 
requested differ significantly. Generally the distributions show that: i) landowners in the 
Environmental/Lifestyle VO group are significantly more willing to accept no financial 
compensation; ii) those in the Economic group are less willing to accept low financial 
compensation; and iii) those in the largest group, the Economic/Environmental VO 
group, are more willing to accept a small amount of compensation between 0% and 50% 
of costs but are the least willing to accept no compensation.  
 
Table 4.6: Compensation Response Crosstab for Value Orientation Groups 
 
Value 
Orientation 
Group N* 
Financial compensation relative to cost 
(distributions in % of N) Total 
(%) 0% 1-50% 50-99% 100% > 100% 
Econ/Envi 672 15 44 29 10 2 100 
Econ 272 17 32 31 17 4 100 
Envi/Life 320 32 36 22 9 0 100 
Total 1264 20 39 28 11 2 100 
Pearson’s Chi-square = 66.4 (Sig. = .000)  
* N is the total number of responses to each benefit scenario 
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     The ANOVA in Table 4.7 used mean values converted from the ordinal data collected 
for the minimum compensation landowners required to participate in the MBI programs, 
explained in the methods chapter. The ANOVA confirms the findings of the Chi-square 
tests, by showing that the means of each VO group differ significantly. Furthermore, the 
Tukey test shows that the means of the compensation requested by the landowners in the 
three clusters are all significantly different from one another. The means show that the 
landowners in the Economic VO group requested the largest mean financial 
compensation, those who were in Economic/Environmental group were in the middle, 
and those in the Environmental/Lifestyle group requested the lowest financial 
compensation. In conclusion, hypothesis three can be accepted: landowners of different 
VO groups do require different amounts of financial compensation to participate in MBI 
programs for ES provision. 
 
Table 4.7: Compensation Response ANOVA for Value Orientation Groups 
Value 
Orientation 
Group N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA 
Mean Difference between 
Value Orientation Groups  
(Tukey Significance) 
F 1 and 2 1 and 3 2 and 3 
Econ/Envi (1) 672 45.31 34.10 19.92 
*** 
-7.17 
** 
10.31 
*** 
17.48 
*** Econ (2) 272 52.48 37.89 
Envi/Life (3) 320 35.00 34.54 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
 
4.3.2 Incentive Requirement Differences between Scenarios 
     To examine how the willingness of the landowners to participate in the MBI programs 
for ES provision is affected by the different non-payment benefit scenarios, a crosstab 
and ANOVA was performed without the landowners being split into VO groups to test 
hypothesis four. Table 4.8 shows the responses of all the landowners in a crosstab to the 
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four scenarios of benefits.  Scenario 1 is that the land management changes from 
participating would provide environmental benefits only. Scenario 2 refers to lifestyle 
benefits in addition to environmental benefits. Scenario 3 is about economic benefits in 
addition to environmental benefits. Finally, Scenario 4 is that landowners see all three 
types of benefits. 
     A Chi-square test was run to examine the association between scenario types and 
levels of financial compensation required by the landowners to participate. The analysis 
showed that the response distribution of at least one scenario was significantly different 
from the other scenarios. Looking at the distributions in Table 4.8, scenarios 1 and 4 vary 
the most from each other, with scenario 1 enticing the lowest willingness to accept low 
financial compensation and scenario 4 enticing highest willingness. Comparing scenarios 
2 and 3, scenario 3 had a larger portion of landowners requiring financial compensation 
above 0% but below 50% of their expected costs to change their practices, and fewer 
required 100% or more. 
 
Table 4.8: Compensation Response Crosstab for Benefit Scenarios 
Scenario N 
Financial compensation relative to cost 
(distributions in % of N) 
Total (%) 0% 1-50% 50-99% 100% > 100% 
1 316 10 32 38 16 3 100 
2 316 20 39 26 13 2 100 
3 316 20 44 26 9 1 100 
4 316 28 43 21 7 1 100 
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 70.3 (Sig. = .000) 
 
     Using the same converted values for the financial compensation categories, each 
scenario was given a mean value and an ANOVA was run (Table 4.9). The ANOVA 
proved to be significant, confirming that the mean compensation levels required under 
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the four scenarios are not all equal. The Tukey post hoc test showed that: i) the mean 
amount of financial compensation required for scenario 1 was significantly greater than 
all other scenarios; ii) under scenario 4, the mean was significantly lower than all other 
scenarios; and iii) under scenario 3 the mean compensation requested was lower than 
under scenario 2, however, the two means were not significantly different. In conclusion, 
hypothesis four can be accepted: different combinations of environmental, lifestyle, and 
economic benefits from participating in providing ES cause landowners to require 
different amounts of financial compensation to participate in the MBI programs, most 
notably when all three benefits are provided together. 
 
Table 4.9: Compensation Response ANOVA for Benefit Scenarios 
Scenario N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA 
Mean Difference between Benefit Scenarios 
(Tukey Significance) 
F  1 and 2 1 and 3 1 and 4 2 and 3 2 and 4 3 and 4 
1 316 56.57 35.16 18.38 
*** 
11.39 
*** 
15.82 
*** 
22.07 
*** 
4.43 10.68 
*** 
6.25 
* 2 316 45.17 36.44 
3 316 40.74 33.80 
4 316 34.49 33.17 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
 
4.3.3 Compensation Response Differences between Benefit Scenarios and Value 
Orientation Groups 
     To determine if there is a relationship between different VO groups and the different 
non-payment benefit scenarios to participate in the MBI programs, two approaches were 
taken, testing hypothesis five. First, the financial compensation requirement responses to 
every scenario were included in a single two-way ANOVA to test if the interaction 
between the benefit scenarios and membership to the VO groups had any effect on the 
variance. The results show that the individual scenario and VO group variables were 
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significant, reflecting the results of the previous two hypotheses; however, the interaction 
variable, between the benefit scenarios and membership of the VO groups, were not 
significant (Table 4.10). The insignificance of the interaction means that the change in 
scenarios had no significant effect on the financial compensation required by landowners 
in one VO group over another. This relationship between scenarios and VO groups is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2, where landowners in one group do not respond all that 
differently from the landowners in other groups with respect to certain scenarios.  
However, when breaking down the responses into the individual scenarios, some 
interaction between MBI benefit scenario and value orientation can be seen. 
 
Table 4.10: Two-way ANOVA of Financial Compensation Requirements by 
Landowners with Scenario, Value Orientation Groups, and the Interaction of the 
Two as the Independent Variables 
Two-way ANOVA 
 
F Sig. 
Benefit Scenario 18.38 .000 
Value Orientation Group  19.92 .000 
Scenario/ Value Orientation Group Interaction .56 .759 
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Figure 4.2: Mean financial compensation requested by landowners organized by 
non-payment benefit scenario and landowner value orientation group. 
 
     The second method to determine if there is a relationship between different VO groups 
and the different non-payment benefit scenarios to participating in the MBI programs 
employed more thorough examination. Crosstabs and ANOVAs for each VO group were 
conducted to find differences among the requested financial compensation levels of the 
benefit scenarios (Tables 4.11 and 4.12). It can be seen through the crosstabs in Table 
4.11 that the response distributions of the three VO group were significantly different for 
the Economic/Environmental and Environmental/Lifestyle groups but not the Economic 
group. This shows that the different benefit scenarios did not cause a large difference in 
the responses of landowners in the Economic VO group, but it did for the other two 
groups.  
     Interpreting the distributions, landowners in the Economic/Environmental VO group 
change their compensation requirements to lower amounts when they see any benefit in 
addition to the base environmental benefits from participating. Members of the 
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Environmental/Lifestyle group reduce their required compensation when any additional 
benefits are provided but the lifestyle benefits of Scenario 2 provide more incentive to 
make the reductions than the economic benefits in Scenario 3, rather than the other way 
around for the Economic/Environmental and Economic groups.  
 
Table 4.11: Compensation Crosstabs for Benefit Scenarios by Value Orientation 
Group 
Value 
Orientation 
Groups 
Pearson’s 
Chi-Square 
(Sig.) Scenario N 
Financial compensation relative to cost 
(distributions in % of N) 
Total 
(%) 0% 1-50% 50-99% 100% >100% 
Econ/Envi 
*** 
51.8 (.000) 1 168 7 32 42 15 4 100 
2 168 13 48 24 12 3 100 
3 168 17 46 29 7 1 100 
4 168 22 49 23 6 0 100 
Total 
 
672 15 44 29 10 2 100 
Econ 14.8 (.252) 1 68 10 28 37 19 6 100 
2 68 13 28 35 22 1 100 
3 68 18 38 26 15 3 100 
4 68 26 32 26 10 4 100 
Total 
 
272 17 32 31 17 4 100 
Envi/Life 
** 
25.1 (.014) 1 80 18 36 33 14 0 100 
2 80 39 30 23 8 1 100 
3 80 29 43 20 9 0 100 
4 80 44 38 13 6 0 100 
Total 320 32 37 22 9 0 100 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
 
     Looking at the ANOVAs in Table 4.12, significant differences were found in the mean 
financial compensation requested for all three VO groups, but to a lesser degree for the 
Economic group. The Tukey post hoc tests show that the biggest differences between the 
compensation requirements of the VO groups is that for the Economic VO group only 
Scenario 4 was significantly different from Scenario 1, whereas for the other two VO 
groups all three scenarios were significantly different from Scenario 1. This difference 
for the Economic group was between Scenario 1 and Scenario 4, meaning the financial 
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compensation that these landowners required was only significantly reduced when all 
non-payment benefits were provided. Although not significant, it can be seen that the 
economic benefits do influence these Economic VO landowners to a greater extent than 
lifestyle benefits, more so than any of the other groups. The means in this table support 
the other interpretation made of the response distributions in Table 4.11. Additionally, the 
largest group, the Economic/Environmental VO, is clearly the most influenced by the 
identification of each individual benefit. 
 
Table 4.12: Compensation ANOVAs for Benefit Scenarios by Value Orientation 
Group 
Value 
Orientation 
Group Scenario N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA 
Mean Difference between Benefit Scenarios 
(Tukey Significance) 
F 1 – 2  1 – 3   1 – 4 2 – 3 2 – 4 3 – 4 
Econ/Envi 1 168 
 
59.23 33.903 16.15 
*** 
13.39 
*** 
18.30 
*** 
23.96 
*** 
4.91 10.56 
** 
5.65 
2 45.83 35.107 
3 40.92 32.189 
4 
 
35.27 30.628 
Econ 1 68 61.03 37.001 3.15 
** 
3.68 13.24 17.28 
** 
9.56 13.6 4.04 
2 57.35 36.410 
3 47.79 37.341 
4 
 
43.75 38.964 
Envi/Life 1 80 47.19 34.904 5.88 
*** 
13.75 
* 
12.81 
* 
22.19 
*** 
-0.94 8.44 9.38 
2 33.44 36.008 
3 34.38 33.132 
4 25.00 30.812 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
 
     Another set of crosstabs and ANOVAs was conducted for each benefit scenario to find 
the differences in the compensation levels of the VO groups (Tables 4.13 and 4.14). From 
Table 4.13, only with Scenarios 2 and 4 was a response distribution from a VO group 
significantly different from the other two. For Scenario 2, the inclusion of the lifestyle 
benefits caused the differences in responses between the groups. As mentioned above and 
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seen in Figure 4.2, compensation requirements are high for landowners of the Economic 
group and low for the Environmental/Lifestyle group when lifestyle benefits are added to 
the base environmental ones. For Scenario 4, the Environmental/Lifestyle VO group is 
much more willing to participate with no or little financial compensation when all 
environmental, economic, and lifestyle benefits are present, than the other groups.  
     Overall, the relative differences between the VO groups reported earlier in Section 
4.3.1 are reflected in Table 4.13: i) landowners in the Environmental/Lifestyle group are 
most willing to accept no or low financial compensation; ii) those in the Economic VO 
group require higher financial incentives than the other clusters, but more members are 
also willingness to accept no financial incentives than those in the 
Economic/Environmental group; iii) landowners in the Economic/Environmental group 
are more willing to accept low financial incentives than those in the Economic group, but 
it seems that the members of this group expect at least a token of financial incentive 
because they are the least willing to accept no compensation.  
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Table 4.13: Compensation Crosstabs for Value Orientation Groups by Benefit 
Scenario 
Scenario 
Pearson’s 
Chi-
Square 
(Sig.) 
Value 
Orientation 
Group N 
Financial incentives relative to cost 
(distributions in % of N) 
Total 
(%) 0% 1-50% 50-99% 100% >100% 
1 12.5 (.130) Econ/Envi 168 7 32 42 15 4 100 
Econ 68 10 28 39 19 6 100 
Envi/Life 80 18 36 33 14 0 100 
Total 
 
316 10 32 38 16 3 100 
2*** 37.0 (.000) Econ/Envi 168 13 48 24 12 3 100 
Econ 68 13 28 35 22 1 100 
Envi/Life 80 39 30 23 8 1 100 
Total 
 
316 20 39 26 13 2 100 
3 13.0 (.112) Econ/Envi 168 17 46 29 7 1 100 
Econ 68 18 38 26 15 3 100 
Envi/Life 80 29 43 20 9 0 100 
Total 316 20 44 26 9 1 100 
4*** 29.4 (.000) Econ/Envi 168 22 49 23 6 0 100 
Econ 68 26 32 26 10 4 100 
Envi/Life 80 44 38 13 6 0 100 
Total 316 28 43 21 7 1 100 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
 
     With the ANOVAs in Table 4.14, all scenarios proved to create a significant 
difference in the means of the landowners’ responses between the three VO groups. 
However, Scenarios 2 and 4 had the most significant results, supporting the findings from 
Table 4.13. The mean financial compensation required by the three VO groups show the 
same ranking in all scenarios with the landowners in the Environmental/Lifestyle group 
requesting the lowest compensation requirement, followed by the landowners in the 
Economic/Environmental group, and then the highest mean amount was required by the 
landowners of the Economic VO group. The mean compensation required by the 
landowners in the Economic/Environmental group was only significantly less than that of 
the Economic group in scenario 2, showing that lifestyle benefits are not strong 
incentives for the landowners with an Economic VO to participate. The mean financial 
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compensation requirement of the Environmental/lifestyle group was always significantly 
lower than those of the other two VO groups except for Scenario 3, showing that 
economic benefits are stronger incentives for landowners with Economic/Environmental 
or Economic VOs rather than an Environmental/Lifestyle VO. 
 
Table 4.14: Compensation ANOVAs for Value Orientation Groups by Benefit 
Scenario 
Scenario 
Value 
Orientation 
Group N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
ANOVA 
Mean Difference between Value 
Orientation Groups  
(Tukey Significance) 
F 1 and 2 1 and 3  2 and 3 
1 Econ/Envi (1) 168 59.23 33.90 3.95** 
  
  
-1.80 
  
  
12.04** 13.84** 
Econ (2) 68 61.03 37.00 
Envi/Life (3) 
 
80 47.19 34.90 
2 Econ/Envi (1) 168 45.83 35.11 8.35*** 
  
  
-11.52* 
  
  
12.40** 23.92*** 
Econ (2) 68 57.35 36.41 
Envi/Life (3) 
 
80 33.44 36.01 
3 Econ/Envi (1) 168 40.92 32.19 2.94* 
  
  
-6.87 
  
  
6.55 13.42** 
Econ (2) 68 47.79 37.34 
Envi/Life (3) 
 
80 34.38 33.13 
4 Econ/Envi (1) 168 35.27 30.63 6.17*** 
  
  
-8.48 
  
  
10.27* 18.75*** 
Econ (2) 68 43.75 38.96 
Envi/Life (3) 80 25.00 30.81 
* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05 and  *** = p<0.01 
 
     In conclusion, the two methods of approach to test hypothesis five show conflicting 
results. The first, which used two-way ANOVA, did not support that the interaction 
between membership of VO groups and the benefit scenarios had an effect on the 
financial compensation required by the landowners. On the other hand, when the data 
was broken into the smaller analyses, differences were seen in the financial compensation 
when the VO groups and the benefit scenarios interact. Therefore hypothesis five can be 
accepted, the interaction of VO groups and benefit scenarios does have an effect on the 
required financial compensation, albeit not pronounced.    
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4.4 Willingness to Accept the Use of MBIs for ES Provision 
     The last set of results show the landowners’ general agreement with the use of MBIs 
to provide incentives to change land management practices for the provision of ES to 
protect water quality. This section is the final sphere of investigation and addresses the 
fourth research objective to identify the factors that influence landowners’ willingness to 
participate in MBI programs for ES provision. First, the statements used to compute the 
dependent variable will be examined, followed by a discussion of the independent 
variables, and finally the regression model will be discussed. 
 
4.4.1 Dependent Variable: General Agreement with the use of MBIs for ES 
Provision 
     Two statements were used to measure the respondents’ level of agreement with the 
use of MBIs for the provision of ES that protect water quality. The responses of the two 
statements were averaged to form a single dependent variable that represents the 
landowners’ general agreement with the use of MBIs for ES provision, and their 
distributions can be seen in Table 4.15. The vast majority answered on the agreeing side 
of the Likert scale (i.e., greater than 4) for the two statements with 77.1% and 84%, 
respectively. The resulting distribution for the dependent variable shows 84.9% of the 
sample had a Likert value of greater than four, and less undecided at only 4.9% rather 
than 11.7% or 8.9%, respectively for the original statements. 
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Table 4.15: Likert Scale Response Frequencies to the Agreement to Use MBIs for 
ES Provision 
Likert scale of agreement 
B3b-a) Agreement 
for MBIs to Prevent 
Fertilizer Run-off 
B3b-b) Agreement 
for MBIs to Promote 
Buffer Zones 
Installation 
Dependent Variable: 
General Agreement 
with MBIs (B3b-a & 
B3b-b) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
1 Strongly disagree 16 4.6 10 2.9 8 2.3 
1.5     0 0 
2 9 2.6 4 1.1 0 0 
2.5     11 3.1 
3 14 4.0 11 3.1 8 2.3 
3.5     9 2.6 
4 Neither agree nor disagree 41 11.7 31 8.9 17 4.9 
4.5     20 5.7 
5 76 21.7 70 20.0 50 14.3 
5.5     50 14.3 
6 109 31.1 113 32.3 72 20.6 
6.5     33 9.4 
7 Strongly agree 85 24.3 111 31.7 72 20.6 
Total 350 100.0 350 100.0 350 100.0 
 
     Table 4.16 provides descriptive statistics for the two original statements from the 
questionnaire and the latent MBI agreement variable. The mean response for B3b-a and 
B3b-b were 5.34 and 5.66, respectively, and therefore the latent variable’s mean was 
5.50. The latent variable’s variance and standard deviation were both less than those of 
the two original statements. Skewness and Kurtosis were an issue for all three, so a 
natural logarithmic transformation was used on the latent dependent variable for use in 
the regression model. 
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Table 4.16: Descriptive Statistics of Agreement to the Use of MBIs for ES Provision 
Variables 
  
 Descriptive Statistics 
B3b-a) Agreement 
for MBIs to Prevent 
Fertilizer Run-off 
B3b-b) Agreement 
for MBIs to 
Promote Buffer 
Zones Installation 
Dependent Variable: 
General Agreement 
with MBIs (B3b-a & 
B3b-b) 
N 350 350 350 
Mean 5.34 5.66 5.4986 
Std. Deviation 1.554 1.393 1.34436 
Variance 2.414 1.939 1.807 
Skewness -1.156 -1.387 -1.209 
Std. Error of Skewness .130 .130 .130 
Kurtosis .983 2.071 1.555 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .260 .260 .260 
 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
     The independent variables consisted of psychological and descriptive items. The 
psychological variables comprised: the eight behavioural belief items, the six normative 
belief items, and the five control belief items from the TPB; the two statements on past 
behaviour and the statements on self-efficacy and moral obligation from the extended 
TPB, and; the dummy variables for the three value orientation clusters identified in the 
previous sections of this chapter. The twenty descriptive variables can be seen in Table 
3.3 and Table 3.4. After running preliminary models and correlation tests, fourteen 
independent variables remained adding to the explanatory power of the model. These 
variables can be seen in Table 4.17.  
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Table 4.17: Regression Variables 
Variable Min. Max. M SD 
MBI agreement 1.0 7.0 5.50 1.32 
be: Environment quality (benefit) 1 49 35.65 11.06 
be: Pride (benefit) 4 49 37.29 10.79 
be: Economic (benefit) 1 49 30.73 12.98 
be: Society (benefit) 3 49 33.85 11.97 
be: Resource reallocation (cost) 1 28 10.56 6.16 
nm: Government 1 49 25.50 13.95 
cp: Knowledge 1 49 21.12 12.27 
cp: Time and finances committed 1 49 21.75 12.31 
Past management (without program) 1 7 6.05 1.18 
Past management (with program) 1 7 3.73 2.04 
Education: university 0 1 0.19 0.40 
Percent of income from land use 12.5 87.5 42.91 33.33 
Family land generations 1 6 1.95 1.14 
Succession of land 0 1 0.61 0.49 
 
4.4.3 Regression Model 
     The ANOVA test of the final log-linear regression model proved it to be significant at 
the .001 level with an F statistic of 14.5. The model itself, as seen in Table 4.18, achieved 
an R
2
 of 0.39 and an adjusted R
2
 of 0.36, which falls within the range of similar TPB 
models. Table 4.18 shows the explanatory power and significance of each independent 
variable. Two independent variables were significant at the 0.01 level, another six at the 
0.05 level, three at the 0.1 level, and three were not significant. Eight variables were from 
the core TPB, two from the extended TPB, and four were personal and land 
characteristics. Only five of the variables had negative coefficients.  
     The majority of the variables in the model were of the TPB. The three behavioural 
beliefs representing benefits of participating that would help society, the environment, 
and the landowners’ sense of pride were significant at the 0.05 level with positive 
coefficients. According to the standardized beta coefficient, they were three of the most 
influential variables. The other two behavioural beliefs, significant at the 0.1 level, 
represented economic benefits and economic costs of participating and had positive and 
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negative coefficients, respectively. This shows that those who believe beneficial 
outcomes over negative ones are more likely to agree with the use of MBI programs for 
ES provision.  
     The only normative belief included was that the government was supportive of the 
action. This was significant at the 0.05 level, and with its positive coefficient, it tells us 
that landowners who are more influenced by the government’s approval are more willing 
to agree with the use of MBI programs for ES provision.   
     Two control belief variables were included in the model. Having knowledge about the 
economic, social, and environmental outcomes was the most influential variable; it had a 
positive coefficient and was significant at the 0.01 level. The control belief that the 
landowners have their time and finances allocated elsewhere was significant at the 0.05 
level, with a negative coefficient. These variables illustrate that landowners who thought 
knowledge of outcome would be an important factor in their ability to participate, and 
those who were less concerned about their time and finances being tied up elsewhere, 
were more likely to agree to the use of MBI programs for ES provision.  
     The only expanded TPB variables that contributed to the model represented the 
landowners’ past behaviour for environmental benefit. Adopting environmentally 
beneficial land management practices on their own accord was statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level with a positive coefficient, but adopting practices as part of an organised 
program was not significant. These variables show that landowners who have already 
adopted practices that could provide ES would be more likely to agree to the use of MBI 
programs. 
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     Finally, four personal and land characteristics were also included in the model. The 
percentage of income gained from use of the land was the most influential of the four and 
was the only other independent variable significant at the 0.01 level. The number of 
generations the land had been in the family was the only other significant variable of this 
group, at the 0.1 level. Both of these variables had negative coefficients. Neither having a 
university education nor having succession plans for the land were statistically significant 
in explaining the dependent variable, but their coefficients were negative and positive, 
respectively.  
     Multicollinearity was not a problem and heteroscedasticity was significantly reduced 
after transformations of the variables, so it should not create any biases. In conclusion, 
hypothesis six can be accepted: the TPB variables are significant in explaining the 
variance in the landowners’ agreement that MBIs should be used for ES provision, 
although a few additional variables also are significant as well.  
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Table 4.18: Coefficients of Regression Model of Theory of Planned Behaviour and 
Extended Variables Predicting Agreement with Use of MBIs for ES Provision 
Independent Variables 
  
 
Sig. 
 
B 
 
Beta   
(Constant) .036   .827   
Behavioural Beliefs (Core TPB)        
Participation benefits society, 
especially downstream (beneficial) 
.007  .157  .021   
Participation increases the quality of 
the environment (beneficial) 
.007  .147  .025   
Participation gives a sense of pride 
(beneficial) 
.006  .131  .046   
Participation provides additional 
economic benefits to land (beneficial) 
.004  .094  .099   
Participation takes resources away 
from other activities (cost) 
 
-.007  -.077  .087   
Normative Beliefs (Core TPB)        
Government 
 
.004  .102  .037   
Control Beliefs (Core TPB)        
Knowledge .009  .203  .000   
Time and finances allocated 
elsewhere 
 
-.005  -.111  .025   
Expanded TPB        
Past land management for 
environmental benefit on own accord 
(D3) 
.049  .112  .015   
Past land management for 
environmental benefit as part of 
organized program (D4) 
 
.013  .050  .285   
Personal and Land Characteristics        
Percent of income from land use  
(F8 recoded to group midpoints) 
-.002  -.145  .003   
Generations of family owning land 
(F12) 
-.040  -.088  .059   
University education (F6 recoded) -.093  -.070  .121   
Have succession plans (answered yes 
to F13) 
.067  .063  .173   
R = .62; R
2 
= .39; Adjusted R
2
 = .36 ANOVA: F = 14.538; Sig. = .000 
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4.5 Hypotheses Results 
     The following table lists the hypotheses, the evidence that does or does not support 
them, and the strength of that evidence.  
 
Table 4.19: Hypothesis Confirmation 
Hypothesis Evidence  Outcome 
H1: Landowners do not 
have uniform values 
influencing their 
decisions in the same 
ways. Instead landowners 
can be grouped into 
distinct groups based on 
the importance they place 
on three value types; 
economic, environmental, 
and lifestyle. 
Cluster analysis based on responses to 
value comparison statements generated 
three VO groups (Figure 4.1) – Moderate 
evidence to accept hypothesis 1 
 
ANOVA and Tukey test on value 
comparison statements: all groups are 
significantly different from one another 
(Table 4.4) – Moderate evidence to 
accept hypothesis 1 
 
ANOVA and Tukey test on the nine 
value statements: at least one group of 
landowners is significantly different for 
each statement  in a manner related to the 
clustering based on the value 
comparative statements (Table 4.4) – 
Strong evidence to accept hypothesis 1 
 
CONFIRMED: Landowners do 
not have uniform values and can 
be grouped based on the 
importance they place on 
economic, lifestyle, and 
environmental values. These 
value orientations hold true when 
tested against other value 
statements.  
H2: Members of each 
value orientation group 
have different land and 
personal characteristics. 
ANOVA and Tukey, and crosstabs and 
chi-square tests proved significant to 
differentiate landowners of the VO 
groups based on personal and land 
characteristics (Table 4.5) – Strong 
evidence to accept hypothesis 2 
 
CONFIRMED: Although not all 
variables were significantly 
different among all groups, 
enough were to provide unique 
descriptions of each VO group. 
H3: Members of each 
value orientation group 
require a different 
financial compensation to 
participate in MBI 
programs for the 
provision of ES. 
Crosstab and chi-square tests show that at 
least one VO group has a different 
response distribution of financial 
compensation needed to participate from 
the other groups (Tables 4.6) – Strong 
evidence to accept hypothesis 3 
 
 
ANOVA and Tukey test shows that all 
three VO groups have mean 
compensation requirements that are 
significantly different from one another 
(Table 4.7) – Strong evidence to accept 
hypothesis 3 
CONFIRMED: Each VO group 
requires different financial 
compensation to participate in 
MBI programs for ES provision. 
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Table 4.19: Hypothesis Confirmation (Cont’d) 
Hypothesis Evidence  Outcome 
H4: Scenarios that contain 
different combinations of 
environmental, lifestyle, 
and economic benefits 
from participating in MBI 
programs for ES 
provision cause 
landowners to require 
different financial 
compensations. 
Crosstab and chi-square show that the 
financial compensation requirements of 
landowners are not the same for all 
benefit scenarios (Tables 4.8) – Moderate 
evidence to accept hypothesis 4 
 
ANOVA and Tukey test show that the 
financial compensation requirements for 
all scenarios are significantly different 
from one another except between 
Scenarios 2 and 3 (Table 4.9) – Strong 
evidence to accept hypothesis 4 
CONFIRMED: The benefits 
scenarios result in different 
requests of financial 
compensation depending on the 
environmental, lifestyle or 
economic benefits listed.  
H5: The changes in 
financial compensation 
required by landowners to 
participate in MBI 
programs for ES 
provision caused by the 
different benefit scenarios 
vary between the value 
orientation groups. 
ANOVA scenario/VO group interaction 
variable was not significant (Table 4.10) 
– moderate evidence to reject hypothesis 
5 
 
Table 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 show 
through ANOVAs and chi-square tests 
that there are different effects of 
scenarios on the responses of the VO 
groups – Strong evidence to accept 
hypothesis 5 
 
 
 
CONFIRMED: Although the 
interaction variable in the 
ANOVA of the mean 
compensation requirements did 
not confirm an interaction 
between VO groups and 
scenarios, a more detailed 
analysis shows that the changes 
in compensation caused by the 
scenarios does vary between VO 
groups. 
H6: The TPB variables 
are significant in 
explaining the variance of 
the landowners’ 
agreement that MBIs 
should be used for water 
quality supportive ES 
provision. 
The regression analysis shows that the 
TPB provided many significant variables 
explaining the agreement with the use of 
MBIs for ES provision (Table 4.18) – 
Strong evidence to accept hypothesis 6 
CONFIRMED: The TPB is 
suitable for explaining 
landowners’ agreement with the 
use of MBIs for ES provision, but 
the extended TPB variable of past 
behaviour and the personal/land 
characteristics of percent of 
income obtained from land use 
and generations of family having 
owned the land were also 
significant.  
 
4.6 Summary 
     The rich data obtained in the survey provided many interesting results about the 
landowners and their beliefs about the use of MBIs for ES provision to protect water 
quality. The people within the sample were older than the average person in the study 
area and were predominately male, which aligns with the traditional role of men being 
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head of a household and in charge of land management decisions. However, with less 
economic dependence on land use, the larger the proportion of women became. Distinct 
value orientation groups of landowners were generated using cluster analysis based the 
relative importance of economic, lifestyle, or environmental values towards land 
management, confirming hypothesis one. Just over half of the landowners (54%) in the 
sample were placed into the Economic/Environmental VO group, which was 
economically oriented but environmentally aware. The Environmental/Lifestyle VO 
group contained a quarter of the landowners, and less than a quarter (21%) was placed in 
the Economic VO group, which was dominated by economic values. The landowners in 
these VO groups differed not only in their values but also in certain personal and land 
characteristics, confirming hypothesis two.  
     The level of financial compensation that the landowners’ requested varied 
significantly across the MBI benefit scenarios as well as across VO groups, confirming 
hypotheses three, four, and five. Scenario 4, with its additional economic and lifestyle 
benefits, incented most of the landowners to be willing to accept no or little financial 
compensation for participating in the ES land management program. Scenarios 3 
(economic benefits in addition to environmental), 2 (lifestyle benefits in addition to 
environmental), and 1 (environmental benefits only) required successively higher 
compensation for participation. The levels of financial compensation requested by the 
landowners in the three different VO groups also varied significantly. The landowners in 
the Environmental/ Lifestyle VO group were the most willing to participate with no 
financial compensation. Those in the Economic/Environmental VO group were most 
willing to participate with a small amount of compensation greater than 0% of their cost 
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but less than 50%, although they were also the least willing to participate with no 
compensation. Those in the Economic VO group asked for the highest levels of financial 
compensation. According to the ANOVA there was no significant interaction between the 
VO groups and the scenarios to influence the level of compensation requested by the 
landowners. However, when examining the scenarios individually, it can be seen that 
some differences in influences from the scenarios do exist between those in different VO 
groups. 
     The MBI agreement variable showed that most landowners are supportive of the use 
of some form of MBI being employed to increase ES provision on their land to protect 
water quality. The regression model used to explain the variance of this dependent 
variable ended up containing fourteen independent variables: eight represented the three 
core elements of the TPB, two past behaviour variables, and four personal and land 
descriptive variables. The result of the regression was an adjusted R
2
 of 0.36. The TPB 
variables provided the majority of influential independent variables with the control 
belief of having knowledge about the potential economic, societal, and environmental 
outcomes of participating in MBI programs for ES provision being the most influential. 
Behavioural beliefs about beneficial outcomes of participating also had a strong 
influence. Past behaviour was the only extended TPB variable to be included, and 
percentage of household income generated by the land was the most influential non-TPB 
variable. Overall this suggests accepting hypothesis six, the TPB variables provided a 
large amount of the explanatory power in the model. The following chapter will discuss 
the results.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
     The results of the three spheres of investigation in this study have been laid out in the 
previous chapter; in this chapter the major findings are discussed in relation to the 
literature as well as possible implications of the research for policy in this area. The first 
sphere of investigation found that landowners in Southern Alberta can be grouped based 
on their value orientations, which were also shown to differ according to socio-
demographic characteristics. The second sphere illustrated how different benefit 
incentives affect the financial reward that landowners would need to receive in order to 
participate in ES provisioning programs. How each VO group reacts to the different 
incentives was also examined. The third sphere identified the variables that influence 
landowners’ willingness to accept the use of MBIs to provide financial rewards in ES 
provision programs. In doing so the effectiveness of the adapted TPB model was 
examined. These three spheres shed valuable light on the ES provision perspectives for 
water quality protection of Southern Albertan landowners within the study area and 
potentially beyond in regard to policy formation. When viewed together, the three 
spheres shed even more light on complex relations between the landowners’ attitudes and 
values and their behaviour in environmental land management.  
 
5.1 Landowners and their Value Orientations   
     Investigating the values of the southern Albertan landowners can provide useful 
information to environmental policy makers.  Looking at the responses to the value 
comparison statements by the sample as a whole (Table 4.3), it can be seen that when it 
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comes to the way in which landowners manage their land, economic factors are the most 
important, with environmental concerns close behind followed by lifestyle 
considerations. Breaking the sample into the VO groups, however, allows for further 
distinction and insight into what drives landowner decision making. 
     Maybery et al. (2005) produced and tested three VO groups of Conservation 
(Environmental), Lifestyle, and Economic values using a survey of 552 Australian 
farmers. The VOs were based on the combination of the psychology literature that 
focused mostly on the economic and environmental values, and the sociology literature 
that focused on economic and lifestyle values. Their approach was adopted to guide the 
value orientation grouping for this thesis. However, instead of these three values forming 
their own unique VO groups, the landowners were classified into groups identified by a 
combination of the values identified by Maybery et al. (2005). These VO groups were 
labelled Economic/Environmental, Economic, and Environmental/Lifestyle after the most 
influential values they were clustered by.  
     Maybery et al. (2005) found that the economic values were independent from the 
conservation (environmental) and lifestyle values, but there was partial overlapping 
between lifestyle and conservation values. This reflects the formation of the 
Environmental/Lifestyle VO group quite well, as these landowners have strong 
environmental and lifestyle values. Furthermore, it was the only group to disagree with 
the importance of economic factors in land use decision making over those of 
environmental or lifestyle and it had the lowest agreement level for the other economic 
value statements. The only economic value statement that it did not disagree with was 
about desiring to increase the value of their land asset, rather than the statements about 
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increasing profits or viewing the land as a business investment. They clearly see their 
land as a place to live and enjoy and as a financial asset to be sold or passed on to the 
next generation, but not as a productive asset. In addition, these landowners were close to 
being neutral on environmental concerns being more important than lifestyle 
considerations. Therefore, it is obvious that economic values have little influence in their 
land stewardship, but environmental and lifestyle values as well as asset management 
have a strong influence together.   
     The Economic VO group is the near antithesis to the Environmental/Lifestyle group 
since it draws influence mostly from the economic values, which Maybery et al. (2005) 
showed to be the most separated from environmental values. Economic factors are more 
important to these landowners in their land management decision making than 
environmental or lifestyle considerations. However, lifestyle considerations are seen as 
more important than environmental concerns. Disagreeing that environmental concerns 
were more important than lifestyle considerations shows that this group has little regard 
for environmental values while lifestyle values hold some importance. However, when 
looking at the lifestyle value statements, all of the groups had a high agreement level, yet 
the only significant differences between the means showed that the Economic group 
agreed less than at least one of the other two groups, illustrating why it was named only 
with the economic value.  
     The Economic/Environmental VO group of landowners embraced the two values that 
Maybery et al. (2005) found to be the most distinct and thought to require ideologically 
different policy pathways. In the comparison statements for this group, economic factors 
were the most important, but it also agreed that environmental concerns were more 
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important than lifestyle considerations. The strong influence of both economic and 
environmental values were also demonstrated by the fact that the 
Economic/Environmental group’s responses were not significantly different from the 
economic group regarding the economic value statements, or from the 
Environmental/Lifestyle group regarding the environmental value statements. That this 
group contains half of the sample should be encouraging for policy makers because it is a 
combination of the other two groups and therefore is likely to be receptive to policy 
pathways that are directed at either of them. The ideologically different policy pathways 
that Maybery et al. (2005) thought would be required may still be needed for the 
Economic and the Environmental/Lifestyle groups however.  
     The polarity of the Economic and Environmental/Lifestyle VO groups on the 
importance of economic and environmental values parallels the egoistic/altruistic value 
continuum used in the broader environmental behaviour literature. With lifestyle values 
not forming the basis of its own group, it is possible that the landowners could have 
interpreted these values in ways that reflected their own position on the egoistic/altruistic 
continuum. This could explain the unanimously high agreement with the lifestyle 
statements. The desire for lifestyle values by the Economic and Environmental/Lifestyle 
VO groups were likely more egoistic and altruistic in nature, respectively. The 
Economic/Environmental VO group, on the other hand, does not fit perfectly in the 
middle between the Economic and Environmental/Lifestyle groups since it was just as 
economically concerned as the Economic VO group, and nearly as environmentally 
concerned as the Environmental/Lifestyle group. This distinction in the 
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Economic/Environmental group shows that although the VO groups can represent the 
egoistic/altruistic continuum, they are also unique from the continuum.  
     Aside from values, the VO groups were also shown to differ in personal and land use 
characteristics. The Environmental/Lifestyle group was the most unique, with significant 
differences from the Economic/Environmental and the Economic VO groups.  Arguably, 
the most central land use difference between the groups was the importance of production 
for the landowner. Those having an Environmental/Lifestyle VO were significantly less 
likely to be producers or be reliant on land use for household income than those with 
Economic or Economic/Environmental VOs. The landowners in the Economic and 
Economic/Environmental groups had the same high likelihood of being producers but the 
Economic VO group was more likely to have diversified farm operations producing both 
livestock and crops. In addition, this group was slightly more likely to have a greater 
reliance on land use for household income than those in the Economic/Environmental 
group. This shows that members of the Environmental/Lifestyle group were more likely 
to be hobby farmers or acreage owners, while those in the other two groups were more 
reliant on agricultural production, especially landowners of the Economic group. The 
finding corresponds with previous studies showing that labour-intensive farming types 
and high dependence of household income on farming activity decrease the likelihood of 
participation in agri-environmental measures (Defrancesco et al. 2008). For this study it 
can be stated that this high dependence aligns negatively with the environmental value 
and positively with the economic ones.  
     There was also a large difference in the proportion of females within each VO group. 
It has been found that females are more likely to have biospheric (environmental) VOs 
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rather than egocentric (economic) ones (Vaske et al. 2001). This is reflected by the 
relative proportions of female respondents in the Environmental/Lifestyle and the 
Economic VO groups. However, others like Stern et al. (1993, Stern and Dietz 1994) 
have shown there is no difference in the strength of egotistic, social-altruistic, or 
biospheric VOs between the sexes when it comes to environmental concern, but females 
have stronger beliefs about any adverse consequences, whether to themselves, other 
people or the non-human environment. This may make the Environmental/Lifestyle VO 
group as a whole more concerned about the adverse environmental consequences of their 
land management. However, the large proportion of females in the 
Environmental/lifestyle VO group might not alone be due to the fact that females have 
stronger environmental values than men. Feminist theory has pointed out that home and 
work are gendered; the work place being the domain of the male and the home, the 
female (Aitken 1992). In traditional farming businesses the primary decision maker of the 
farming operation is male and in this study it has been shown that if the land is an acreage 
or a hobby farm, women take on a larger role in land management as it deals more with 
managing their rural lives rather than work place. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
the Environmental/Lifestyle VO group had the greatest proportion of female respondents 
as a primary land manager and the Economic group has the lowest.  
     The landowners’ rural or urban upbringing, the number of generations the family has 
owned the land and succession planning were also correlated to the VO groups. Members 
of the Economic group proved to have stronger rural ties as they were most likely to be 
raised in a rural setting, had a longer family history owning the land, and they were the 
most certain about succession of the farm to the next generation. The opposite was seen 
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in the Environmental/Lifestyle group while the Economic/Environmental group ranged 
between the other two for all three variables. These rural ties seem linked to more 
traditional utilitarian beliefs of the Economic VO group. Longer family history on the 
land might have transferred these traditional beliefs through the generations, and those 
who plan to follow the tradition of passing the farm on to the next generation are less 
likely to participate in environmental programs as they focus on building the productive 
capacity of the farm to make it viable for the next generation; that is they have to take a 
more long term view on risk. Those who don’t have successors may be more willing to 
adopt less intensive farming operations to become more environmentally friendly as 
shown by Potter and Lobley (1992). 
     The rural or urban question in relation to environmental concern has been asked for 
decades and in earlier research it has been shown to be positively correlated to 
socialization in larger urban areas while farmers and their offspring are less likely to 
support environmental protection (Lowe and Pinhey 1982). This illustrates the main 
difference between the Environmental/Lifestyle group’s environmental support and the 
Economic group’s more traditional utilitarian beliefs. However, in more recent research, 
Huddart-Kennedy et al. (2009) found that although rural people who were raised in an 
urban setting had stronger environmental worldviews and weaker egoistic values than 
rural people who were socialized in an rural area, there was no difference in the extent of 
environmentally supportive behaviour. This dynamic between older and more recent 
research is also present when examining the environmental concern of rural and urban 
residents in general. The older studies showed rural residents expressed much less 
environmental concern than their urban counterparts (Lowe and Pinhey 1982, Alm and 
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Witt 1997), while the more recent research shows that the difference is negligible, 
although specific concerns are more salient to one group or the other (Berenguer et al. 
2005, Huddart-Kennedy et al. 2009, Bjornlund et al. 2014). The Economic VO group 
seems to still be more relatable to the older studies, while the Economic/Environmental 
group relates more with the newer studies that show equal environmental concern or 
performance to those who grew up in urban settings.   
     The findings related to education were somewhat contradictory to the general 
literature, which finds that people with higher education are more likely to engage in pro-
environmental spending (Alm and Witt 1997) and stewardship (Huddart-Kennedy et al. 
2009), or express environmental concern (Vaske et al. 2001, Klineberg et al. 1998). 
However, this study found that the pro-environmental Economic/Environmental group 
had the lowest proportion of landowners educated above high school and the Economic 
group was most likely to have an education beyond it. On the other hand, although the 
Environmental/Lifestyle group did not have the largest portion educated beyond high 
school, it did have the largest portion with university degrees. With that it can be seen 
that there is no clear gradient with amount of education and pro-environmental attitudes, 
but perhaps there is a relationship with the type of education. The agriculturally 
productive Economic VO group had the largest portion of landowners with college 
diplomas, which were likely to be agriculturally related or more utilitarianly oriented 
towards economic values. While there is also a large proportion with a college diploma in 
the Economic/Environmental group, there are nearly as many with only a high school 
education or no completed formal education at all. Having a less formal agricultural 
education may mean they are more inclined to be influenced by government information 
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and be more willing to participate in environmental land management. Members of the 
Environmental/Lifestyle group are least likely to have an agriculturally related education 
since few of these landowners gain income from land use. The university degrees and 
college diplomas help them obtain higher paying jobs which can support their rural 
lifestyle as hobby farmers or acreage owners. The educations in this group allow for their 
land to not solely be seen as a business and that protecting the environment on their land 
protects their lifestyle.   
     These land and landowner characteristics add valuable insight into the three VO 
groups and help explain the importance of each value. For the agricultural producers, 
economic values were most important as they align with their business purposes. The 
Economic group may have also been less environmentally concerned because they have 
more traditional mentalities passed down from working the land for generations. The 
Economic/Environmental VO group seems less traditionally bound and more open to 
environmental values. This could also be a product of being less trained or focused in 
agricultural business. It is also interesting to note that this group seems to fall within a 
continuum of responses between the other two VO groups for most variables. The 
Environmental/Lifestyle group holds stronger environmental values because it reflects 
their lifestyle values (i.e., a better environment improves their lifestyle benefits) and they 
do not need to think about the economic impact as they do not depend on the land for 
their household income.  
     The vast majority of the respondents from all VO groups expressed a high level of 
agreement with lifestyle being an important value. For that reason it was not very useful 
in identifying and differentiating the groups. In spite of this, the lifestyle value should not 
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be overlooked, as it contains a social aspect that may help entice landowners to 
participate. Marshall (2004) found that farmers’ preparedness to cooperate in 
implementing the plans of community-based programs of natural resources governance in 
Australia was more affected by social oriented factors, such as community benefits, than 
private or business ones. Therefore, he suggests that these social factors should be given 
greater representation than it has in the past when designing and implementing programs 
of natural resources governance. In the case of southern Alberta, the near uniform 
importance of lifestyle values could suggest that addressing the lifestyle benefits of a 
program for ES may improve the likelihood of its success.  
 
5.2 Financial Compensation and Intrinsic Benefits from ES Program Participation 
     The main purpose of ES land management programs is to protect ES that provide 
benefit to the environment for ourselves, others, wildlife and habitat, and future 
generations, and in the context provided in the questionnaire the main purpose was to 
protect water quality. For someone to act solely for these reasons, that person would 
require a high level of altruism. As the investigations of this thesis research have shown, 
some people are not driven by altruism alone. For those more on the egoistic side of the 
continuum, it is important to stress that many ES provision activities not only create 
benefits for the environment, but may also create benefits directly to the landowner. They 
do so by improving environmental quality of the land and water resources and thereby the 
enjoyment of using it for recreation, health safety, and general wellbeing and they may 
also provide economic benefits such as increased land value and land productivity (GoA 
2007, Knowler and Bradshaw 2007). However, these benefits tend not to be focused on 
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by policy makers when making programs for ES provision, since they are not the purpose 
of the programs. In the interest of developing MBIs that provide even further financial 
incentives to entice landowner participation, policy makers should know how to 
maximise the effectiveness of the financial compensation they are willing to pay. To do 
this, the additional benefits of the program need to be identified and made clear to the 
landowners. In this section we discuss the impact of introducing lifestyle and economic 
benefits, which landowners might not normally be aware of in addition to the 
environmental benefits, on the level of financial compensation required to entice 
landowners to accept ES programs.  
     The graph in Figure 4.2 illustrates how the mean financial incentive landowners 
require lowers with additional benefits included in the benefit scenarios and how it differs 
between the VO groups. From the average of the entire sample (Table 4.9), including 
both the economic and lifestyle benefits to the environmental ones (Scenario 4) as 
outcomes from participating in ES programs reduced the financial compensation required 
to participate by 22% compared to the baseline of the environmental benefits only 
scenario (Scenario 1). The individual addition of the economic benefits (Scenario 3) and 
lifestyle benefits (Scenario 2) also created significant reductions from the baseline 
Scenario 1. However, the responses to Scenario 4 were still significantly lower than both. 
This simple result confirms that when designing and implementing ES programs, policy 
makers should identify as many additional benefits of implementing a proposed program 
as possible and communicate them to the landowners. The lifestyle and economic 
benefits will provide incentive to those who are less environmentally altruistic, and the 
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smaller amounts of financial compensation payments would cut down the implementation 
cost of the program. 
     Looking at the results in Section 4.3.3, evidence can be seen that each group of 
landowners respond to the different benefits according to their VO. The 
Environmental/Lifestyle group was the least motivated by economic benefits but it had 
the lowest mean financial compensation requirement for all scenarios. ‘No financial 
incentive’ was the most common response for this group when lifestyle benefits were 
included (Scenarios 2 and 4), otherwise they most commonly required a small amount of 
compensation for only environmental benefits (Scenario 1) or the addition of economic 
benefits (Scenario 3). The inherently low financial compensation requirement from the 
Environmental/Lifestyle group can be attributed to their strong altruistic environmental 
values, while the lifestyle benefits provide the group with enough personal gain that 
many would be willing to participate with none of their implementation cost returned to 
them. Since economic values are not important to this group, it is not unexpected that 
economic benefits failed to outperform lifestyle benefits in reducing the financial 
incentive, unlike for the other two VO groups. These results are not surprising as the 
Environmental/Lifestyle landowners are less reliant on their land for income. 
Additionally, their landholdings are smaller in area and predominately used for lifestyle 
purposes so participating in such programs will come at little or no financial risk and they 
gain in environmental and lifestyle benefits.  
     The Economic VO group had the highest mean financial compensation requirement 
out of the three groups for each benefit scenario, illustrating its limited environmental 
concern and the limited influence of the additional benefits. Only when all benefits were 
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presented in Scenario 4 was a significant difference from Scenario 1 seen. However, the 
economic benefit seems to be the greatest driver for this group to reduce their required 
financial compensation, and although it was not significantly different than when the 
lifestyle benefits were presented on their own, the economic benefit reduced the mean of 
financial compensation 10% more than the lifestyle benefits. The responses of the 
Economic VO group to these benefit scenarios live up to the business only approach 
outlined in their value orientation description. With the least environmental concern, the 
most intensive agricultural production and the highest reliance on land use for income, all 
found to be related to non-participation in agri-environmental measures (Defrancesco et 
al. 2008), it is clear that members of the Economic VO group would be the most reluctant 
to participate, even with added benefits. The egoistic/altruistic value continuum is again 
illustrated between this group and the Environmental/Lifestyle VO group.  
     The Economic/Environmental VO group again did not fall into the egoistic/altruistic 
continuum exactly between the other two groups. It had almost the same high financial 
compensation requirements as the Economic group for Scenario 1, showing that it is not 
as environmentally altruistic as the Environmental/Lifestyle group. Furthermore, it was 
also the least willing to participate in any of the scenarios with no financial 
compensation. However, once additional benefits were included, the group significantly 
increased its willingness to participate with a low financial compensation; it had the most 
significant drops in compensation means of all the value orientation groups. This shows 
that members of this group, which is over 50% of the sample, see the value of the 
environmental programs and the benefits they provide, but they need at least a token of 
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financial contribution/subsidy. It falls in line with their environmental concerns but also 
in line with the business needs of their farming operations. 
     In this part of the study it was shown that overall the financial compensation needed to 
adopt MBIs for ES can be reduced by 22% through informing the landowners that they 
can gain lifestyle and economic benefits in addition to the environmental by 
implementing the land management changes. It also demonstrated that the three VO 
groups do behave differently in response to the incentives and benefits offered to them. 
The Environmental/Lifestyle VO group was the most willing to participate solely for 
environmental reasons, but was also highly influenced by lifestyle benefits. The 
Economic VO group was the least willing to participate in any scenario but economic 
benefits seem to provide some motivation to reduce the financial compensation they 
would require from the program. Finally, the Economic/Environmental VO group was 
most influenced by additional benefits. Environmental benefits alone were not enough to 
convince them to participate without the aid of a larger amount of financial 
compensation, but once they see benefits to themselves, whether through lifestyle or 
economic values, the Economic/Environmental group’s willingness to participate with a 
small amount of compensation increased significantly. It is also interesting to note that 
not enough landowners chose the disincentive of a threat of a fine for not participating 
over the financial incentives to use it in the analysis, showing that landowners in 
Southern Alberta prefer rewarding MBIs over penalising mechanisms.  
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5.3 The Theory of Planned Behaviour and Landowners’ Agreement with the Use of 
Market-Based Instruments 
     The third and final sphere of investigation in this thesis was to discover what factors 
influence the willingness of landowners to agree with the use of MBIs to promote the 
provision of ES for the protection of water quality, and to determine if the TPB and 
expanded factors are useful tools for explanation of this willingness. The high mean and 
negative skew of the responses to the statements forming the latent variable of general 
agreement for the use of MBIs in ES provision that protect water quality shows that most 
landowners are willing. The adapted TPB model used was successful at explaining 36% 
of the variance (according to the adjusted R
2
) in the regression model against this 
variable. Other adapted TPB models have shown a range of R
2
 values of about .20 to .55 
in predicting water conservation (Trumbo and O'Keefe 2001, Lam 2006, Clark and 
Finley 2007) and riparian zone management (Corbett 2002, Fielding et al. 2005). The 
results from this study thus fall within a normal range of R
2 
values from TPB studies in 
different fields. A meta-analysis, conducted by Armitage & Conner (2001), of 185 
independent studies indicated that the TPB variables account for, on average, 39% of 
variation in behavioural intentions.  
     With this TPB model being an adapted version, the Attitude Towards the Behaviour, 
Subjective Norms, and Perceived Behavioural Control variables that are core to the TPB 
were not directly included as outlined by Ajzen (2006). They were, however, all 
represented in the final regression model through five behavioural beliefs, one normative 
belief, and two control beliefs that form them. This allowed the model to show which of 
these beliefs were most influential in predicting the dependent variable of the 
landowners’ general agreement with the use of MBIs for the provision of ES. In addition, 
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the final model included only past behaviour from the extended TPB, and four landowner 
and land characteristics. 
     The Attitude Towards the Behaviour had a strong representation through the 
numerous behavioural beliefs that were included in the regression model.  All but one 
behavioral belief was beneficial and they all gave representation to the three values used 
in forming the value orientations (i.e., increased quality of environment – Environmental; 
sense of pride and benefits to society – Lifestyle, and; additional benefits to society and 
taking resources away from other activities – Economic), showing that all three values 
need to be considered in the formation and education of ES programs. The VO groups did 
not contribute as factors in the regression model, but we can see that the altruistic beliefs 
of improving the quality of the environment and providing benefits to others in society 
are more powerful predictors than economic beliefs. It would then be safe to say that the 
Environmental/Lifestyle VO, who have more altruistic values, are more likely to accept 
the use of MBIs for ES provision than the Economic group. However, that may be 
because of their desire to protect the environment and not as related to the use of MBIs. 
Fielding et al. (2005) showed that landowners who intended to manage their riparian land 
were more driven by favourable cost-benefit analysis and having stronger beliefs about 
the beneficial outcomes and weaker beliefs about the negative ones, than were those with 
weak riparian management intentions. Since most of the behavioural beliefs included 
here were beneficial, it shows that beliefs about benefits are more associated with 
participation than those about cost. Therefore, all known benefits of participation need to 
be communicated to the landowners as much as possible to counteract any preconceived 
idea of cost that they might have of MBIs for ES provision.   
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     For Subjective Norms, the only normative belief that predicted the agreement to use a 
MBI program to protect water quality through ES provision was the government’s 
approval. The more people thought that the government would approve of participating, 
and the greater their motivation was to comply with what the government expects of 
them, the more likely they were to agree to participate. This is similar to the findings by 
Konisky et al. (2008) where more trusting individuals are more likely to support 
government action to address pollution and other global environmental issues. On the 
other end, May (2005) found that those who are more politically conservative are less 
likely to have a strong sense of duty to comply with voluntary approaches to 
environmental regulation. A rancher who participated in the preliminary interviews and 
showed values and characteristics of the Economic value orientation stated,  
“Anytime you get talking government programs it gives way to abuse, it 
creates a false market place, and plus it creates more bureaucracy. All of 
which increase your taxes. So, no. To make a real short answer, no there 
shouldn't be any government programs because if it's not economically 
viable then you shouldn't be doing it anyway”.  
 
This politically conservative remark clearly expresses that he thinks the government 
should not be promoting environmental programs. So another way to look at the findings 
of the government normative belief is that those who care less about the government’s 
opinion are less likely to agree to MBIs programs, which might be a more useful 
statement. 
      For the last TPB variable, the Perceived Behavioural Control, the control beliefs were 
highly significant, one being the most significant variable in the regression with the 
strongest beta coefficient. This variable represented knowledge of the impacts of 
participating as control factor and had a positive coefficient. This result means that the 
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landowners will tend to participate in the MBI programs more actively if they strongly 
agree that having a clear understanding of the environmental, economic and social 
impacts of introducing MBIs represents an important factor in deciding to participate in 
the MBI programs aiming for ES provisions. This result supports strongly the findings in 
the literature. For instance, in a meta-analysis on farmers’ adoption of conservation 
agriculture, Knowler and Bradshaw (2007) argue that ‘awareness’ has often been found 
to be positively correlated to adoption. Rosenberg and Margerum (2008), in their study, 
show that ‘unfamiliarity’ is a significant barrier for landowners to adopt conservation 
practices for watershed restoration in Oregon. Therefore the awareness of the 
environmental, economic, and social impacts of adopting new land management practices 
should be given important consideration in designing policies enticing landowners’ 
participation in new MBI programs for ES provision to protect water quality.   
     The second control belief showed that those who believe that their time and finances 
are allocated elsewhere were less likely to agree to the use of MBIs in an ES program. 
Rosenberg and Margerum (2008) found that finances, time and labour were the most 
common barriers that prevented landowners from adopting conservation practices for 
watershed restoration in Oregon. This factor can also be directly related to the findings of 
Defrancesco et.al. (2008) that showed labour-intensive farming types constrained 
participation in agri-environmental measures. Therefore, it can be expected that 
landowners like those in the Economic value orientation group, who have intensive 
operations requiring large amounts of time and financing, are susceptible for this control 
belief to limit their willingness to participate.  
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          Looking at the three variables suggested by other researchers using the expanded 
TPB (Ajzen 1991, Conner and Armitage 1998, Corbett 2002), past behaviour was the 
only one included in the final regression model. Past behaviour of adopting environment 
practices through organised programs and through their own accord were both included 
in the model with positive coefficients. This indicates that past land management for 
environmental purposes are good indicators of future participation. However, having 
done so on their own accord is a stronger predictor than having done so as part of an 
organised program, as it was the third most significant variable in the model while the 
assisted behaviour was not statistically significant in the model. This is likely due to the 
former having a deeper connection to the landowners’ environmental values instead of 
being assisted in their choices by programs which required less of their own judgement.  
Whereas adopting environmental land management practises on their own shows signs 
that they likely have a strong environmental value orientation. However, a dairy producer 
from the preliminary interviews, who expressed views similar to the 
Economic/Environmental value orientation, answered in response to participating in new 
ES programs that he would do so if there was some sort of assistance or additional benefit 
since “for [him] it’s not worth spending the time filling the paperwork out.” This example 
illustrates the frustration and hassle with his past participation in ES programs that limit 
his desire to participate in more without some benefit to him. Much like in the incentive 
scenarios discussed earlier, providing information on the additional benefits one might 
gain other than just the environmental ones for participating might help sway those who 
are less environmentally oriented, or feel that participating in one program is enough, to 
agree to participate in a MBI program.  
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     Only four of the land and landowner characteristics contributed to the regression 
model, and only two were significant. The first was the income from land use with a 
negative coefficient, which was the strongest variable in predicting the agreement to 
using MBIs for ES provision that was not core to the TPB. Drawing from Defrancesco et 
al.’s (2008) findings that those who are more reliant on their land for income are less 
likely to participate in agri-environmental measures, it can be seen here that that 
relationship is still true with the use of MBI programs for the provision ES. It is this 
group of people that will be most difficult to entice to participate in future MBI programs 
for ES provision, but providing incentives that speak to their economic values may help 
as seen with the Economic value orientation group and the additional benefit scenarios.  
     The second significant land or landowner characteristic was the number of generations 
the landowner’s family had owned the land, which had a negative coefficient. A longer 
family history can lead to more traditional views of land management and aversion to 
government or outsider interference. This ties to the normative belief that shows those 
who care less about what the government thinks are also less willing to agree to the use 
of MBIs for ES provision. The rancher quoted that no government programs should exist 
to promote ES provision is a good example of this since he had long family ties to his 
land and other traditional views that match the Economic value orientation.   
    Although not significant, the negative coefficient of the university education variable 
does not match what could be expected based on the findings of the highly university 
educated Environmental/Lifestyle value orientation group which was most likely to agree 
to participate in ES provision programs. It is likely that since many environmental groups 
think that the use of MBIs instead of involuntary regulation will result in less 
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environmental protection overall (Hockenstein et al. 1997), that the university educated 
who tend to be more environmentally concerned may be less likely to agree with the wide 
use of MBIs but still require the least amount of financial incentive to actually participate 
in a MBI program. Finally, not significant either, those who were sure to have successors 
for their land were more likely to agree to the use of MBIs in ES programs, which 
opposes what was found by Defrancesco et al. (2008).  
     In summary, it can be said that most landowners are willing to adopt MBIs to protect 
water quality through ES provision, and the model helps us to understand why. The 
landowners’ agreement is promising for successful implementation of MBIs in Southern 
Alberta to protect water quality and healthy ecosystems in general, and the model 
performed adequately compared to other TPB models.  
     However, the TPB is best suited for predicting specific behaviour so the generalized 
statements used may have limited its performance. Once specific programs are fleshed 
out, stronger models can be created with a narrower scope. That said, this model was able 
to show that those who are less concerned about the environmental, economic, and 
lifestyle effects of the programs and heavily rely on their land for income are the least 
likely to agree with the use of MBIs for water quality protection through ES provision. 
Those who value the benefits of the programs higher than the costs are more willing to 
participate, while those who see costs as greater are less willing. Past environmental land 
management is a sign that landowners are willing to accept the use of MBI programs for 
ES provision, mostly if they have done so on their own accord. Lastly, those with more 
generations of ownership of the land are likely to have more traditional views and 
therefore are less willing than others, which can be coupled with the lower willingness by 
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those who had less concern about what the government thought about the way they 
managed their land. Overall, the TPB provides many important factors in explaining the 
landowners’ agreement with the use of MBIs in ES programs, consisting of a wider range 
from the behavioural beliefs, and fewer but potent normative and control beliefs.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
     This study explored the willingness of landowners in the Oldman River Basin of 
southern Alberta to participate in MBI programs for the provision of ES to protect water 
quality. It used values and attitudes as a base for explaining willingness to participate. To 
do this, three spheres of investigation were conducted to: 1) identify groups of 
landowners based on their Value Orientation (VO) and identify characteristics common 
to members of each group, and identify how groups differ with respect to these 
characteristics; 2) establish the willingness of VO groups to participate in MBI programs 
for ES provision and how they responded to different benefits from participation based 
on economic, environmental, and lifestyle benefits, and; 3) identify the factors that 
influenced the landowners’ agreement with the use of MBI programs to protect water 
quality through ES provision, using an adapted version of the TPB framework. The first 
step was a literature review, which provided an overview of the links between values, 
attitudes and actual behaviour of landowners. The review found that studies like this are 
very context specific and as a result no universal explanatory factors of behaviour have 
been identified, but many are commonly used in previous studies.  
  
6.1 Key Findings 
     This study identified that landowners within the Oldman River Basin can be clustered 
into three VO groups which can be classified as Economic/Environmental, Economic, 
and Environmental/Lifestyle. Members of the Economic group are more egocentric and 
are governed primarily by economic values, while for members of the 
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Environmental/Lifestyle VO group are more altruistic, being governed by environmental 
and lifestyle values. The Economic/Environmental VO group, which represented over 
half of the respondents, does not fit exactly in the middle of this egoistic/altruistic value 
continuum. The members are as economically concerned as those of the Economic VO 
group and nearly as environmentally concerned as those of the Environmental/Lifestyle 
group. For all VO groups, there was little variation with lifestyle value because they were 
important to all, and therefore should not be overlooked.  
     The VO groups also differed according to personal and land characteristics. The key 
difference between the groups was that both the Economic and Economic/Environmental 
groups contain large portions of agricultural producers, with the former being more 
reliant on it for income, while the Environmental/Lifestyle groups contained more 
acreage owners and hobby farmers. This creates a divide in how they view their lands and 
therefore manage it. 
     Members of the VO groups required different amounts of financial compensation to 
participate in MBI programs for ES provision, with those in the Environmental/Lifestyle 
group requiring the least and those in the Economic group requiring the most. 
Additionally, different combinations of environmental, lifestyle, and economic non-
payment benefits reduce the financial compensation the landowners require, with the 
greatest reduction created when all benefits are presented together. There was also 
evidence that the interaction between the membership of VO groups and benefit scenarios 
had an effect on the required compensation levels. Here the differences found were that 
the Economic group started with high compensation requirements and the benefits had 
little effect on those requirements. The Economic/Environmental group also started with 
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high requirements, but any additional benefits resulted in larger drops in compensation. 
Finally the Environmental/Lifestyle group was the only group where lifestyle benefits 
were more influential in reducing the financial incentive requirements of their members 
than economic benefits.   
     The final part of the study showed that the TPB is useful in identifying the factors that 
influence landowners’ willingness to participate in MBI programs that promote the 
provision of ES for water quality protection. Only fourteen independent variables were 
used in the regression model, most of which were TPB variables. Landowners who were 
less concerned about the environmental, economic, and social outcomes of participation, 
had weaker beliefs in beneficial outcomes of participation,  rely heavily on their land for 
income, and haven’t adopted land management changes for environmental purposes in 
the past were most likely not to support the use of MBIs for ES provision.  
 
6.2 Policy Implications 
     This study provides some sense that MBIs will be acceptable to most landowners in 
southern Alberta for the provision of ES to protect water quality and ecosystems in 
general. Studies such as this can help make planning efforts more efficient. An 
understanding of the different VOs that landowners in southern Alberta hold in relation to 
their land use, can aid policy makers and planners to tailor policies and programs to 
encompass the unique values of the smaller groups instead of only the average of the 
population. Flexible, well-designed MBIs would be ideal tools to entice participation of 
the Economic, Economic/Environmental, and Environmental/Lifestyle VO group 
members. The economic egoistic needs can be met with financial incentives, and those 
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with more altruistic environmental and lifestyle values were shown to be willing to 
participate with little or no financial incentive. The majority, however, will require at 
least a token of financial incentive since the Economic/Environmental group has 
economic needs as well but can recognise the other benefits from participating in 
environmental land management programs that also speak to their economic and lifestyle 
values. With the goal of ensure quality water for healthy aquatic ecosystems in the WFL 
strategy trailing behind efforts to attain this water for the drinking water and economic 
goals (Poirier and De Loe 2011), the lesson for policy makers and planners from this 
research is that the environmental benefits should not be targeted in the programs alone. 
When economic, lifestyle, and environmental benefits can be attained together from 
joining the program, it will increase the landowners’ willingness to participate and 
therefore reduce costs of mitigation. This is reflected in the regression model with the 
TPB, where the most significant variable reflected concern over uncertain economic, 
social and environmental outcomes. Additionally, those who believed beneficial 
outcomes were more likely to occur were more likely to participate, so policy makers 
should focus on promoting as many additional benefits to the environmental purposes as 
possible.   
 
6.3 Limitations and Areas for Further Study 
     The biggest limitation of this study is that some of the statements used in the 
questionnaire may have been too general to polarize the level of agreement. This study 
took a general approach to discovering how values and attitudes affect their willingness 
to participate in MBI programs to provide ES to protect water quality, but without 
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specific programs that the landowners were familiar with, the hypothetical land 
management changes and costs of doing so relied on their best estimate. Further research 
could be undertaken when actual MBI programs for ES provision are being introduced so 
the goals of the programs, the changes required by the landowners, and the costs of doing 
so can be better explained to landowners so they can give more informed answers. 
Asking the landowners in relation to a more specific situation would also aid in the 
outcome of the TPB model, as it is designed to predict specific behaviour, and in the case 
of this study it was used to understand the agreement with the use of unspecified policy 
that could have reduced its effectiveness. In addition, once programs are being planned a 
survey can target a specific group of landowners for whom the program is related, such as 
crop producers or livestock producers, which will reduce noise from landowners that may 
not be able to participate such as acreage owners. Another area of further study 
academically would be to expand the area of the study to see how well the three VOs 
hold up across the entire South Saskatchewan River Basin. The larger sample size should 
allow for separate regression tests for all three VO groups instead of just for the entire 
sample. That way the factors that account for variance in agreement to use MBIs for ES 
protection can be compared across VOs. Finally, an area of research that this can be 
expanded into is the inclusion of geographical location or land type as a variable. It 
would be interesting to see if different values or beliefs have any spatial relations within 
southern Alberta.  
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APPENDIX I – Preliminary Landowner Interview Schedule  
 
1. In what ways do you think the rural environment is important for southern 
Alberta? 
  
2. What sort of activities do you carry out on your land? 
 
3. How long have you owned this land? 
(a) Has it been passed down through generations? 
(b) Do you hope to pass it on to your children? 
 
4. What was the reason you became a landowner and what sort of benefits do you 
gain from it?  
(a) Do these benefits strongly influence the way you manage your land? 
 
5. Do you think other people benefit from the way you keep your land? 
(a) How does their benefit affect the way you manage your land? 
 
6. What values would you say you hold towards your land (economic, lifestyle, 
conservation, etc.)? 
(a) Can you explain why you identified these values? 
(b) Do these values influence the way you manage your land? Which ones 
are the most influential and how so? 
 
7. For you, what is the best way to manage your land (i.e. to get the most value out 
of it, to make sure the ecosystem is not harmed, to keep it in good condition to 
pass it on to your children, etc.)? 
 
8. Are you concerned about keeping your land environmentally healthy, if so, what 
are the reasons? 
 
9. With only about 19% of Alberta’s population being rural, and about a third of the 
province’s land owned and used by rural landowners, mostly farmers and 
ranchers, do you think that they are doing their part to meet the needs of society 
and the environment? 
(a) Should the rural population take on more responsibility to protect the 
environment, or is it the responsibility of the government? 
 
10. From the Water Act, Alberta’s Water for Life strategy outlines three main goals to 
ensure a safe and reliable supply of water for drinking, a healthy environment, 
and a sustainable economy.  The conservation of natural ecosystems and 
stewardship of land to provide ecosystem goods and services is considered to be 
an important part of supplying the quality of water needed to meet the goals.  Do 
you feel that there is much you can do to help provide these ecosystem goods and 
services? 
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11. What is your attitude towards being asked to supply ecosystem goods and services 
for the benefit of the environment and others in society? 
(a) Have you ever changed the way you managed your land for these 
reasons before? 
 
12. If the government, or an NGO, was to assist landowners in adopting beneficial 
management practices to supply ecosystem services, how would you prefer to 
receive this assistance? 
(a) Do you think Market-based instruments such as payments for 
supplying ecosystem goods and services, credit trading, or tax benefits 
would be a useful and acceptable? How do you think they should 
operate?  
 
13. What do you believe the advantages are of you supplying ecosystem goods and 
services on your property? 
 
14. What do you believe the disadvantages are of you supplying ecosystem goods and 
services on your property? 
 
15. Is there anything else you associate with you supplying ecosystem goods and 
services on your property? 
 
16. Are there any individuals or groups who would approve of your supplying 
ecosystem goods and services on your land? 
 
17. Are there any individuals or groups who would disapprove of your supplying 
ecosystem goods and services on your land? 
 
18. Are there any other individuals or groups who come to mind when you think 
about supplying ecosystem goods and services on your land? 
 
19. What factors or circumstances would enable you to supply ecosystem goods and 
services on your land? 
 
20. What factors or circumstances would make it difficult or impossible for you to 
supply ecosystem goods and services on your land? 
 
21. Are there any other issues that come to mind when you think about the difficulty 
of supplying ecosystem goods and services on your land? 
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APPENDIX II – Over-the-Phone Questionnaire 
Int1 
 
Hello, My name is _____. Today we're conducting a study with local landowners about land management 
decisions This is not a sales call.  
 
This research is being done on behalf of researchers at the University of Lethbridge and the Alberta Water 
Research Institute.  
 
Are you a rural landowner within the Municipal District of Willow Creek or the County of Lethbridge and 
above the age of 18? 
 
([If the person answering the phone is not a landowner over 18: ask if there is someone else in the 
household who is and ask to speak to that person]) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Call back later 
4 Not interested 
 
T1 Show If Not_landowner_or_over_18 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
 
  Status Code: 71 
 
CB3 Show If callback_in_int1 
 
Go to call back page 
 
  Status Code: 99 
 
T0 Show If refused_In_int1 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
 
  Status Code: 74 
 
Int2 
 
Would you consider yourself a long-term decision maker for your land, if not can I speak to someone in 
your home who is? 
 
([IF DECISION MAKER IS NOT HOME: Ask: Would there be a convenient time to call back to reach 
him/her? 
 
Long-term decision maker: The household member who makes land management decisions that may affect 
their land in the long run. People who recently moved onto a property qualify, but people who only rent 
land shouldn’t qualify.]) 
 
1 Yes 
2 Yes, getting person 
3 No, call back later 
4 No, refusal 
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T2 Show If refused_in_int2 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
 
  Status Code: 72 
 
CB1 Show If callback_in_int2 
 
Go to call back page 
 
  Status Code: 99 
 
Int3 
 
<<int3_intro>>  
 
Your number was randomly chosen, the survey is voluntary, your responses will be kept strictly 
confidential and anonymous. It will take about 25-30 minutes depending on your answers. and there are no 
known risks or anticipated discomforts expected from participating; however, you may withdraw at any 
time.  Your opinions are very important to us and although there is no direct benefit to you in participating, 
your responses will help in the research of a Master’s and a PhD student, as well as help inform policy 
makers on rural landowners’ opinions and attitudes related to environmental issues and the use of market-
based instruments to address them.  Would you be interested in participating in this research project by 
answering some questions? 
 
([If NO: Ask: Would there be a more convenient time for me to call back?]) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No, call back later 
3 No, refusal 
 
T3 Show If refused_in_Int3 
 
Thank you for your time. Good bye. 
 
  Status Code: 73 
 
CB2 Show If callback_in_int3 
 
Go to call back page 
 
  Status Code: 99 
 
 
Int4 
 
Great, before we get started I’ll just let you know that if you have questions about the research, I can supply 
you with the contact information of Kyle Howard, a Master’s student at the University of Lethbridge.  
Also, if you have questions regarding your rights as a participant, then I can give you the phone number to 
the Office of Research Services at the University of Lethbridge; however, the Office of Research Services 
will not be able to answer general questions about the study. 
 
I’d also like to inform you that this call may be monitored for quality assurance purposes. 
 
([IF ASKED: 
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Kyle Howard:  Phone: 403-329-2535 or Email: kyle.howard@uleth.ca 
Office of Research Services:  Phone: 403-329-2747 or Email: research.services@uleth.ca]) 
 
 
A1 
 
The first questions are about you, your land and the benefits you derive from it. Please indicate your level 
of agreement with the following statements using a 1 to 7 scale with 1 being “strongly disagree”, 7 being 
“strongly agree”, and 4 in the middle being “neither agree nor disagree”. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. A maximum annual financial return 
from your property is your most 
important aim. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Managing environmental problems 
on your land is a high priority 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The lifestyle that comes with living 
in a rural area is very important to 
you. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Increasing the asset value or net 
worth of  your land is very important 
to you. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. For you, a rural environment is a 
better place to live than an urban 
environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Your right to do what you want with 
your property has to be balanced 
against wider environmental 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. You view your land as first and 
foremost a business investment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Rural communities are a great place 
to live and raise a family. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. The most important thing is leaving 
your property in better shape than 
you found it. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. When faced with decisions that 
affect the way you manage your 
land, economic factors tend to 
outweigh lifestyle considerations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. When faced with decisions that 
affect the way you manage your 
land, economic factors tend to 
outweigh environmental concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l. When faced with decisions that 
affect the way you manage your 
land, environmental concerns tend to 
outweigh lifestyle considerations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
B1 
 
With the same 1 to 7 scale, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements on water 
quality: 
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 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
Water quality issues are well 
recognized in your area. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Instead of using regulation to control 
water quality, government should 
use other means such as voluntary 
approaches or market incentives. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The provincial government should 
be the entity held accountable and 
responsible for water quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Landowners, including farmers, 
ranchers, municipalities, golf 
courses, first nations, and so on, 
should be accountable and 
responsible for water quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
B2 
 
Next I will provide you with a definition followed by some related questions: 
 
Ecosystem services is a term that collectively represents all the free services humans receive from nature, 
including clean water and air, crops, wood, flood protection, soil regeneration, and aesthetic and 
recreational values.  
 
Globally these services are being degraded. Within the County of Lethbridge and the Municipal District of 
Willow Creek poor water quality reduces the provision of ecosystem services which impacts different 
people, including land owners, farmers, recreational users, municipalities, first nations, and so on. 
 
Now on the same 1 to 7 scale, please indicate your level of agreement with the following two statements: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
Your land provides Ecosystem 
Services that benefit you and your 
family 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Improving water quality within the 
County of Lethbridge and the 
Municipal District of Willow Creek 
will increase the benefits that your 
family gets from your land 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
B3a 
 
Now I will provide you with the context for the next questions. 
 
Globally, governments are starting to use a number of instruments to complement regulations to deal with 
some environmental or ecosystem services issues. Financial incentives are voluntary instruments that 
provide a monetary incentive to change behaviour or practices. Financial disincentives require monetary 
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penalties for some behaviour or practice. A key reason that financial incentives and disincentives are used 
is that they can be more cost effective than just regulation. Market-based instruments incorporate these 
incentives and disincentive. 
There are a broad suite of market-based instruments including subsidies, markets, cap and trades, payments 
for delivering ecosystem services, funding mechanisms, tax breaks, environmental taxes, and so on. 
Lessons from using market-based instruments are that they need to be set-up for a specific issue and be 
based on the values and nature of the community to ensure they fit. 
 
Now on the same 1 to 7 scale as the previous questions, please indicate your level of agreement to the next 
two statements: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
The use of financial incentives to 
improve water quality is currently 
understood by members of the 
Municipal District of Willow Creek 
and the County of Lethbridge. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Cost effectiveness is an appropriate 
reason for using market-based 
instruments to improve water quality 
in this area. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
B3b 
 
Continuing on the same theme, there are some specific practices that lead to water quality problems. 
Manure management contributes to water quality problems and is an issue for a number of farmers in this 
area. Fertilizer and pesticide application is also a source of water quality problems.  The following are 
specific issues that contribute to water quality problems in Southern Alberta; please indicate your level of 
agreement to the next two statements with the same 1 to 7 scale: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
As fertilizer run-off contributes to 
water quality issues market-based 
instruments should be used to 
provide incentives to change land 
management practices to reduce run-
off. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. As buffer zones in specific areas can 
help limiting run-off and thereby 
improve water quality market-based 
instruments should be used to 
provide incentives to install buffer 
zones. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
B4 
 
Now on the same 1 to 7 scale as the previous questions, please indicate your level of agreement to the next 
three statements, assuming the government has a limited amount of money to use to address the water 
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quality issues in the Municipal District of Willow Creek and the County of Lethbridge. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
As the greater community benefits 
from increased water quality, the 
government should pay landowners 
to modify their land management 
practices to increase water quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Land use regulations should be 
changed so that landowners with 
good conservation practices that 
benefit water quality are provided 
incentives and those with poor 
practices are penalised. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The use of substances that are 
proven to degrade water quality 
should be limited to improve water 
quality. You would only agree with 
this approach if the landowners who 
reduce the use of these substances 
can earn a credit that can be sold to 
those landowners who are not able to 
reduce their use of these substances. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
C1a 
 
Each of the following questions describes a possible outcome that might occur if you change the 
management of your land to improve the provision of ecosystem services. Using the same 1 to 7 scale as 
the previous questions, please indicate your level of agreement to the following statements: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
It will help to improve 
environmental quality, such as 
habitat, or water and air quality. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. It will take away your time, labour, 
financial, and land resources from 
other activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. It will give you a sense of pride in 
how you take care of your land. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. It will provide economic benefits 
such as increased property values or 
productivity levels. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. It will reduce your ability to compete 
in local, regional, or global markets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. It will help protect the well-being of 
future generations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. It will increase paperwork and red 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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tape. 
h. It will benefit others in society, 
especially nearby or downstream. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
C1b 
 
Now, about the same set of outcomes that might occur if you changed the management of your land, please 
express how desirable you find each of these outcomes using a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being highly 
undesirable, 7 highly desirable and 4 neither desirable nor undesirable or no opinion: 
 
 Highly 
undesirable 
Neither desirable nor 
undesirable or no 
opinion 
Highly desirable  
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
A healthy environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Taking away your time, labour, 
financial, and land resources from 
other activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. A sense of pride in how you take 
care of your land. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Economic benefits such as increases 
in your property value or 
productivity level. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. A reduced ability for you to compete 
in local, regional or global markets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Protection of the well-being of 
future generations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Paperwork and red tape. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Providing benefit to others in 
society. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
C2a 
 
Using the 1 to 7 scale, with 1 being “strongly disagree”, 7 “strongly agree”, and 4 “neither agree nor 
disagree”, state your level of agreement with the next set of statements  about  what other parties would 
think if you made changes to your land management to improve the provision of ecosystem services. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
Members of your family would think 
it's a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. The government would think it’s a 
good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Professionals, scientists and 
members of environmental or 
conservation groups would think it’s 
a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Your neighbours and peers would 
think it’s a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. People who gain recreational or 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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aesthetic benefit from your land 
through activities like hunting, sight-
seeing, and so on would think it’s a 
good idea. 
f. Members of agricultural 
communities and organizations 
would think it’s a good idea. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
C2b 
 
Now considering the same parties, please express how much you want to do what they think you should 
do, when it comes to making changes to your land management to improve the provision of ecosystem 
services.  Answer on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 being “not at all” and 7 “very much”: 
 
 Not at all  Very much 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
Your family. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. The government. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Professionals, scientists and 
members of environmental or 
conservation groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Your neighbours and peers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. People who gain recreational or 
aesthetic benefit from your land 
through activities like hunting, sight-
seeing, and so on. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Members of agricultural 
communities and organizations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
C3a 
 
In the next set of questions I will provide you with some factors that may or may not limit your ability to 
change your land management to improve the provision of ecosystem services. Please express your level of 
agreement with the following statements on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 meaning “strongly disagree”, and 7 
“strongly agree”: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
Not having a clear understanding of 
the environmental, economic and 
social impacts of introducing such 
changes is likely to be a factor. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. External economic factors and 
market forces are likely to be factors. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The physical characteristics of your 
land are likely to be factors. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. The weather is likely to be a factor. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Having your time and finances 
allocated elsewhere is likely to be a 
factor. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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C3b 
 
The next set of questions is about the degree of difficulty the previous factors would add to the process of 
changing your land management to increase the provision of Ecosystem Services.  Using a scale of 1 to 7, 
with 1 meaning the factor would make it “very difficult”, 7 “very easy” and 4 “neither difficult nor easy, or 
no opinion”, please respond to the following: 
 
 Very difficult Neither difficult nor 
easy, or no opinion 
Very easy 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
Not having a clear understanding of 
the environmental, economic and 
social impacts of introducing such 
changes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. External economic factors and 
market forces. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. The physical characteristics of your 
land. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. The weather. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Having your time and finances 
allocated elsewhere. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
D1 
 
The next set of questions looks at your thoughts on how you manage your land and past actions you have 
undertaken that have provided environmental benefits.  Please express your level of agreement with the 
following statements on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 meaning “strongly disagree”, and 7 “strongly agree”: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Strongly agree 
a. <font color="blue">NEW 
QUESTION</font> 
You feel morally responsible to 
ensure that the management of your 
land does not cause harm. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. How you treat your land doesn’t 
make a difference to the quality of 
the environment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. You have adopted land management 
practices to fix environmental 
problems and benefit the ecosystem 
on your own accord without the aid 
of government or other organised 
programs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. You have adopted land management 
practices as part of government or 
other organised programs to fix 
environmental problems and benefit 
the ecosystem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Eint 
 
Thank you - Now, Increasing the supply of ecosystem services often requires landowners to change the 
way they manage their land. Such changes are often associated with costs in terms of money and time.   
Market-based instruments try to provide financial incentives or disincentives to encourage landowners to 
make such changes.  However, increasing the supply of ecosystem services might also provide benefits to 
you, the landowner. With that in mind, please answer the following questions about hypothetical land 
management programs created to improve the provision of ecosystem services. 
 
 
E1 
 
If the program only provides benefits to the natural environment due to improved ecosystem service 
provision, what would be the lowest level of financial incentive provided to you that would make you 
willing to participate? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 No incentive or 0% of your costs covered 
2 Some of your costs covered, 50% or less but greater than 0% 
3 Most of your costs covered, so greater than 50% but less than 100% 
4 Full compensation of your costs, 100% 
5 More than full compensation of your costs, so greater than 100% 
6 The threat of a fine 
 
-9 Don't know 
-8 Refused 
 
E2 
 
If the program also increased the productivity or value of your property due to improved ecosystem 
service provision, what would be the lowest level of financial incentive provided to you that would make 
you willing to participate, using the previous incentive options? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 No incentive or 0% of your costs covered 
2 Some of your costs covered, 50% or less but greater than 0% 
3 Most of your costs covered, so greater than 50% but less than 100% 
4 Full compensation of your costs, 100% 
5 More than full compensation of your costs, so greater than 100% 
6 The threat of a fine 
 
-9 Don't know 
-8 Refused 
 
 
E3 
 
If the program also enhanced your lifestyle through community, aesthetic or recreational value due to 
improved ecosystem service provision, while not providing direct economic value, what would be the 
lowest level of financial incentive provided to you that would make you willing to participate, using the 
previous incentive options? 
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(Please select one) 
 
1 No incentive or 0% of your costs covered 
2 Some of your costs covered, 50% or less but greater than 0% 
3 Most of your costs covered, so greater than 50% but less than 100% 
4 Full compensation of your costs, 100% 
5 More than full compensation of your costs, so greater than 100% 
6 The threat of a fine 
 
-9 Don't know 
-8 Refused 
 
E4 
 
If the program also increased the economic value of your land and enhanced your lifestyle due to 
improved ecosystem service provision, what would be the lowest level of financial incentive provided to 
you that would make you willing to participate, using the previous incentive options? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 No incentive or 0% of your costs covered 
2 Some of your costs covered, 50% or less but greater than 0% 
3 Most of your costs covered, so greater than 50% but less than 100% 
4 Full compensation of your costs, 100% 
5 More than full compensation of your costs, so greater than 100% 
6 The threat of a fine 
 
-9 Don't know 
-8 Refused 
 
 
 
F1 
 
Thank you - We have almost completed the survey. The final set of questions is about yourself and your 
land. 
 
DO NOT READ - Record Gender 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Male 
2 Female 
 
F2 
 
In what year were you born? 
 
  ___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F3 
 
What is your marital status? 
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(Please select one) 
 
1 Single and never married 
2 Legally married 
3 Common-law 
4 Separated 
5 Divorced 
6 Widowed 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F4 
 
How many children do you have? 
 
  ___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F5 
 
In what year did you finish your highest level of schooling? 
 
  ___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F6 
 
What type of certificate, diploma or degree did you receive? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 No certificate, diploma or degree 
2 Secondary (high school) diploma or equivalency certificate 
3 College or other non-university certificate diploma (including apprenticeship or trade) 
4 University Bachelor's Degree 
5 University Master's or Doctorate degree 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F7 
 
What is your approximate net annual household income? 
 
  $___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F8 
 
How much of your net income is derived from the use of your land? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 0 to less than 25% 
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2 25% to less than 50% 
3 50% to less than 75% 
4 75% to less than 100% 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F9 
 
How many acres of land do you own? 
 
  ___________acres 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F10 
 
Are any of the following the primary use of your land? 
 
(Please select all that apply) 
 
1 Residence 
2 Dryland farming 
3 Irrigation within an irrigation district 
4 Private irrigation 
5 Specialty crops 
6 Beef production 
7 Poultry production 
8 Pork production 
9 Dairy production 
10 Other agricultural related business 
11 Renting to agricultural users 
12 Personal recreation 
13 Tourism and recreational business 
14 Other (specify): 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F11 
 
Were you raised in a rural setting? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F12 
 
Up to and including yourself, how many generations has your land been in your family? 
 
  ___________ 
 
-8 Refused 
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F13 
 
Do you expect your land to remain in your family for the next generation? 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Maybe 
 
-8 Refused 
 
F14 
 
On a political scale of left to right wing, would you consider yourself to be: 
 
(Please select one) 
 
1 Right wing (more conservative) 
2 Centrist (moderate) 
3 Left wing (more liberal) 
 
-8 Refused 
 
End 
 
Alright, thank you for your time. That concludes the questionnaire. Your participation is much appreciated, 
and a short report summarizing the results of the survey will be published on the internet at 
www.waterresearch.net in advance of the final results being published as part of a Master’s Thesis as well 
as in professional and academic journals.  But again, your responses will be kept strictly confidential and 
you will remain anonymous. Unless you have any further questions I would like to thank you again and 
wish you a good day/evening. 
 
  Status Code: -1 
 
